



The Group of 78 Annual Conference
GETTING TO NUCLEAR ZERO: BUILDING COMMON SECURITY FOR A
POST-MAD WORLD Ottawa: 22-23 September 2017

FRIDAY SEPTEMBER 22 KEYNOTE SPEAKER: Tariq Rauf
Restoring Canada's Leadership in Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament

Tariq Rauf said that when “US Defence Secretary Robert S. McNamara adopted “mutual assured destruction” (MAD) as the official US strategic doctrine, it was based on a US capability to destroy 50 percent of the USSR’s population and industry in a retaliatory strike. Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin in 1967 was told to “develop a similar capability to ensure stable deterrence.” Nuclear deterrence is based on this “readiness for war fighting that targets predominantly civilians.”

Today, nine states possess 4,150 operationally deployed nuclear warheads, for a total of just under 15,000 available nuclear warheads.

De-alerting Nuclear Weapons:

The US President has twelve minutes to decide, and can then launch the entire nuclear arsenal, with no over-rides. It is said that in Russia, President Vladimir Putin once claimed the sequence of actions that could annihilate humanity was mostly automated. These are reasons enough for both Russia and the US to remove deployed nuclear forces from ready-to-launch status and reduce the “risks of nuclear weapons launch, including from computer error, cyber-attack, accidental release, unauthorized ‘insider’ launch, false warning of enemy attack and crisis nuclear decision-making.”

Nuclear Risk Reduction

The idea¹ of reducing nuclear risks during the Cold War incorporated centres shared by both the US and USSR. In 1987 a direct communications link was made between Washington and Moscow, and ballistic missile launch notifications, inspections, eliminations and conversions were exchanged and placed in databases. Later cooperation to deal with the (Y2K) Millennium Bug “led to the setting up of the Joint Strategic Stability Centre at Peterson Air Force”, followed in 2000 by early warning processes to reduce the likelihood of responding to false warnings. These were positive cooperative measures and “it would be advisable for Canada to propose establishment of Global

¹ Originally connected to US Senators Sam Nunn and John Warner: See <https://www.state.gov/t/isn/215573.htm>
“Agreement Between The United States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers”

Nuclear Risk Reduction and Strategic Stability Centres with the participation of the nuclear-armed States” to increase the security and safety of nuclear weapon systems in the immediate timeframe, and prior to weapons elimination.

Verification of transparency measures

Devising workable, credible, scientifically sound and cost-effective verification procedures is a complex business and few states have the resources to monitor and verify dismantlement, Rauf said.

“The practical way forward would be for each of the nine nuclear-armed States to follow the South Africa model – dismantle their own nuclear warheads and make available records for international verification.” They can then place materials under an international monitoring and verification regime.

Fissile Material Treaty

While the General Assembly adopted a resolution in 2016, led by Canada, on a treaty banning the production of new fissile material for nuclear weapons (FMCT), there was also a waiver given in 2008 to nuclear exports to India by the Nuclear Suppliers Group.²

Today, about 1,800 metric tonnes of weapon-usable materials exist in 25 countries, more than 4/5 of which are in non-civilian use.

Rauf said that “only a Fissile Materials Treaty covering future production and stockpiling as well as current stocks” will result in the irreversibility of nuclear disarmament and allow for sustained regional security. The lack of attention to existing stocks is an “in-built defect in the ‘Shannon mandate’³ [that] has blighted discussions on a FMCT for more than two decades”.

Non-Proliferation and Prohibition Treaties

“Canada’s role in the NPT review process has slowly diminished since 1995” and it came as a rude shock in 2015 when Canada joined the US and the UK in denouncing the NPT draft presidential outcome document. While Canada has chaired the 2014-2015 Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) and chairs the new GGE, “their value remains doubtful”. Effective multilateral warhead verification, Rauf added, “likely is not a realistic or achievable proposition.”

The new Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons “has rattled the five nuclear-weapon States, NATO members and others relying on extended deterrence.” NATO has urged its members to steer clear of the TPNW. India and Pakistan have also been critics. **NATO stated in September** that “the ban treaty is at odds with the existing non-proliferation and disarmament architecture. This risks undermining the NPT, which has

² The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is comprised of [48 states](#), including Canada, that coordinate their export controls to non-nuclear-weapon states.

³ The “Shannon Mandate” established an Ad Hoc Committee on a “ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices” and was named after Canadian Ambassador Gerald Shannon.

been at the heart of global non-proliferation and disarmament efforts for almost 50 years, and the IAEA Safeguards regime which supports it. ... As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.”

It is deplorable, Rauf said, that some of the nuclear-weapon States are threatening non-nuclear-weapon States, including Sweden, Kazakhstan and Switzerland, and others, to not sign. We should remember that the international community is not only 15 States that form the Security Council, or 29 NATO States, but as well the 159 States that signed the Humanitarian Pledge, and 122 States that approved the new ban treaty.

We should also persist in “calling out the increasing dangers of inadvertent or deliberate nuclear war in the Korean peninsula and globally, support de-alerting of ready to launch nuclear weapons, strengthen the NPT through enhanced verification capabilities for the IAEA and implementation of nuclear disarmament through the TPNW, and encourage a new strategy to suffocate renewed nuclear arms races.” We should reverse exports of nuclear material and technology to non-NPT States, develop a plan of action for the 2018 United Nations high-level international conference on nuclear disarmament; and help establish Global Nuclear Risk Reduction and Strategic Stability Centres. Canada can elaborate a clear NACD agenda in its “quest for a Security Council seat for 2021-2022.”

DISCUSSION

Question: Should another agency be created, rather than the IAEA, to do verification?

Answer: The IAEA does not have and never has had the capability to do verification of nuclear weapons disarmament. However, the system could be adapted to do the monitoring and the eventual dismantling of nuclear weapons.

There are some who are opposed to nuclear power, but there are also many peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The baker that uses gloves may have had them treated in an autoclave oven powered by a nuclear source. Not every aspect of nuclear power and nuclear technology is problematic.

The Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in 2010 sent a letter to the IAEA to devise a monitoring mechanism to verify that reports of plutonium coming from each site had been subjected to an agreed form of reactor burn up, making it very difficult, if not impossible, to reuse the material for nuclear weapons. The IAEA developed a technology called 'attribute verification' with an information barrier. But this knowledge needs to remain with these states so that we do not proliferate technical information.

For Iran to be liberated from all restrictions, the IAEA must certify and declare that all nuclear material is under safeguards but also that there are no indications of undeclared nuclear material and activities.

There are some who make good arguments for the multilateral approach, but what level of confidence is required? When the governance structures are complicated, dealing with

issues of compliance is even more complicated, and amending the IAEA statute is nearly impossible.

The IAEA has expertise in monitoring civilian nuclear use. Most of the nuclear weapons inspectors are from non-nuclear weapons states who shouldn't see nuclear weapons. And there are technical experts from nuclear weapons states, but their mandate is to do verification of civilian capacities.

If you don't have the nuclear material, you can't have a bomb at the end of the day. If you can keep track of the nuclear material, and then sound the alarm, that is more effective than worrying about whether each of these 50,000 nuclear warheads has been cut up into little bits.

Question: Has fissile material actually been eliminated or downgraded?

Answer: Yes, we have actually eliminated fissile material. 500 metric tons of Russian highly enriched Uranium from dismantled warheads was bought by the US under the Megawatts for Megatons program. During the period of this program, 25% of the electricity generated by nuclear power in the US (10% of the total) came from ex-Soviet nuclear warheads. The US has also converted some of its own highly enriched uranium.

The calculation of 125,000 or so equivalent warheads still existing as current stocks of nuclear material is based on the Hiroshima/Nagasaki scale of weapons.⁴

Question: What is the legal status of nuclear weapons based in NATO countries?

Answer: The Netherlands and Germany take turns saying this was known at the time the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) was negotiated, and was therefore grandfathered, and there is "no contradiction" between the stationing of nuclear weapons in some NATO European countries and obligations under the NPT. The US says that members of NATO are not comfortable with removal of nuclear weapons, and a two-tier system where some states have a nuclear guarantee and others don't isn't desirable.

Question: What about Iran and DPR Korea?

Answer: The IAEA in every report that it has issued since July 2015 has certified that Iran has been living up to its nuclear obligations. There have been 2 or 3 exceptions where Iran went marginally over the allowed limits in the amount of heavy water it could possess. Those were very small amounts and were reversed.

In his video **William Perry** said the world is more dangerous when we are not talking to each other. And the way of resolving crises is to sit and talk. Former head of US intelligence **James Clapper** said last year⁵ that the DPRK nuclear weapons capability is not reversible. An unfortunate reality, and that's where we need to start.

⁴ About 15-20 kilotons of TNT.

⁵ <https://www.politico.com/story/2017/08/13/clapper-north-korea-nuclear-weapons-241589>

Comment: I think NATO should be abolished, not only because of its continued maintenance of nuclear deterrence, but because of its continued violation of international law, and because it is our membership in NATO that is the prime motivation for our defense policy leading us in a dangerous direction of heightened militarism and military spending.

Question: What can we do? Where are the pressure points in the system?

Answer: The negotiating climate has become very unfavourable at the level of discourse. Canada had one big idea, that all 189 states should report on how they are implementing the 64 actions agreed at the NPT Review Conference in 2010. While this may be a good practice in diplomacy, it has become a paper churning exercise.

Civil society needs to put more pressure on government ministers. But the media have a big role to play too. Most media people do not cover these particular issues and are under pressure to write a report. We need to train the media, as was done at the former Canadian center for arms control.⁶

⁶ One website set up in aid of journalists writing about nuclear issues is atomicreporters.com.

Saturday September 23

“The Prohibition Treaty: A New Political Moment”

Remarks by Hon. Douglas Roche, O.C.

Former parliamentarian and disarmament ambassador **Douglas Roche** said the world appears to be going in two different directions: The joy we should be enjoying with the progress of humanity is smothered by the fear and threat of the worst possible consequences.

No one thinks the new nuclear weapon prohibition treaty (TPNW) will eliminate nuclear weapons, he said, but it will help stigmatize them and directly challenge the military doctrine of nuclear deterrence. We should recognize that we are at that historical stage where advocating abolition of nuclear weapons is ridiculed.

“I want to align myself immediately to the policy of Canadian Pugwash Group,” he said. “Canada should sign the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons, change its own practices and policies, and bring NATO in conformity with the Treaty.” That call was also recently published in the Hill Times,⁷ and The Group of 78 is one of more than 65 supporters of the statement.

NATO nuclear deterrence is a policy position; it is not a binding legal obligation that prevents a NATO member from signing the TPNW. Since the early days of the alliance, members have always had the right to hold their own national positions on nuclear weapons. “It is therefore a fallacy to claim Canada must leave NATO to join the treaty.” In fact, in December of 2000 NATO itself stated that it was committed to meaningful public discussion about nuclear disarmament.

Some nuclear weapon states need to lead the alliance in a dialogue about nuclear weapons; First by confining weapon-holding states to nuclear deterrence only and ending first use policy, and then bringing in policies to remove all nuclear weapons.

The prohibition treaty forces Canada to clarify its ambiguous position on nuclear weapons. Roche asked: “Will it support the nuclear ban treaty or promote nuclear deterrence? Two opposite paths: one is the end of nuclear weapons, the other is their eventual certain use.”

⁷ “We call on the Government of Canada to sign the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and to state that Canada will, through dialogue and changes to its own policies and practices, persist in its efforts to bring NATO into conformity with the Treaty, with a view to Canada ratifying the Treaty as soon as possible.” The Hill Times, September 20, 2017. See also: <http://web.net/~cnanw/CALL2017EN.docx>

**Panel 1 – Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations: Status and Prospects Moderator: Bev Delong, Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons Panelist: Cesar Jaramillo, Executive Director, Project Ploughshares
Panelist: Michael Hurley, Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of Ireland in Ottawa**

Canada needs to stand up to its southern neighbor, **Cesar Jaramillo** said. It was inevitable that the new prohibition treaty or something like it would arrive. Other options, including the 13 steps⁸ from 2000, the 64 action items⁹ from the 2010 NPT review conference haven't produced. It's been the step-by-step approach, and recently the "progressive" approach. The nuclear-armed community went from 5 to 8 members, and "states spend billions of dollars on modernization of nuclear weapons and creation of mini nuclear weapons." We've allowed India to weaponize, and turned a blind eye to Israel. Patience! while the US-North Korean polemic pushes us towards a nuclear weapons exchange.

One argument of the skeptics however that Jaramillo agreed with, is that if nuclear weapons states and nuclear umbrella states truly believe that nuclear weapons keep the peace, and if they think it is legitimate to continue to possess nuclear weapons, they shouldn't join the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW).¹⁰

The deterrence debate – Does nuclear deterrence "work"? -- isn't easily settled, and so we need to highlight the humanitarian argument, which ethically and in terms of safety and security, far outweighs any perceived benefits of nuclear weapons.

"We need to get one country to break rank" -- one NATO member needs to sign the treaty and come out against nuclear weapons, Jaramillo said. But only a handful of people showed up in Toronto recently to sign the symbolic "peoples' treaty" in support of the nuclear ban. That's evidence that other issues and efforts have had the public's attention, including environmentalism, and LGBTQ rights, but not the nuclear threat to the same extent. Our work is cut out for us.

Michael Hurley said that a focus on the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons has shifted the entire discussion on its axis. Ireland is closely associated with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Now the TPNW is under sustained sniper fire by skeptics. There have been phone calls in the night warning countries not to sign; this is a clear sign of an important new treaty. There are skeptics out there and those who are marginally skeptic even among us. Back in 2014, the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) paper took months for a first draft to be produced. Even then, it was a hard sell because its goal was to promote Article 6 of the NPT, and the obligation of nuclear weapon states to disarm as soon as possible. By comparison, the new ban treaty is a massive step forward, particularly at a time we seem prone to take steps backwards.

⁸ <https://www.armscontrol.org/aca/npt13steps>

⁹ <http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/>

¹⁰ <https://www.un.org/disarmament/ptnw/>

DISCUSSION

Where did the humanitarian discussion originate? The matter came to life in the weeks leading up to 2012. Switzerland proposed a short regional group statement, and six countries signed on. That grew to 80 countries, despite their being scornfully dismissed. Civil society has also played a strong role. Then there were a series of conferences, in Oslo, Vienna and Nayarit, and states started coming together.

One lesson here is that it is important to speak firmly but continue to be polite. Not every state and civil society organization was aligned but in Ireland there is very little disagreement between the government and civil society on the nuclear weapons question. There is also a history of work on nuclear abolition beginning with the Irish resolution in the late 1950s and early 60s.¹¹ Certainly, participation of the International Campaign Against Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) has been innovative and energetic and, besides, it isn't likely that governments alone can lead this process.

We should not exaggerate the impact of civil society either: The many protests and petition signatures couldn't stop the Iraq war. The effort always needs to be socialized, and should be non-partisan, or become a bi-partisan state objective, not just one political party's objective.

After the creation of the TPNW, "now comes the hard part". NATO is a big part of the problem. We will be looking throughout this conference at specific panels on common security and security arrangements that don't depend on nuclear weapons. We may like the "Don't bank on the bomb campaigns" but bankruptcy on its own is not going to be the undoing of nuclear weapons. **Where is the conversion campaign?**

We see an intersection of human rights law, and multi-state stakeholders, and we now consider civil society as part of the dialogue. It will be helpful and useful for Canada to work with like-minded states in NATO to change nuclear policy there and build on relationships. This is a long, long, road that we are on, and it will tax the patience and wisdom of all of us.

¹¹ In 1960 Canada, under then Prime Minister Diefenbaker, co-sponsored the Irish proposal which led eventually to the establishment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Panel 2: Common Security: Major Impediments

Moderator: Metta Spencer, Science for Peace, Editor of Peace Magazine

Panelist: Marius Grinius, Former Ambassador

Panelist: Tom Collina, Ploughshares Fund (USA)

Marius Grinius referred to the late Hannah Newcombe's article in Peace Magazine from 1990, where she wrote that "in a world of sovereign nation-states, the predominant [realist] concept of security has been unilateral competitive national military security." In contrast, "common security is centred on war avoidance. In the nuclear age, resorting to war could potentially be suicide."

There have been many kinds of security. A major shortcoming of **collective security** is that it still is nationalistic, and based on the principle of the collective responsibility of nation states. **Common security**, Newcombe wrote, "embraces a series of measures, some oriented toward disarmament, some toward arms control, some toward peacekeeping, some toward strengthening international organizations, some toward tension reduction, better understanding, [...] confidence-building, [and] removing the injustices that breed war. It is not concerned with assigning blame, but with discovering causes of war [and] designing measures to counteract them. It is not designed for what happens "the day after" someone attacks (in a nuclear strike, that would be too late to do anything) but what can be done 'the day before', right now."¹²

Grinius believes that nuclear weapons are becoming passé, and the new battlegrounds are cyberspace and outer space. But, he said, it is true that "a nation cannot be secure without all other nations enjoying security at the same time."¹³ **So what are the major impediments to adopting common security? They include:**

- 1) Distrust among the United Nations Security Council Permanent Five Members (P5) and their failure to live up to explicit non-proliferation commitments.
- 2) Geopolitics: For example Russia, by annexing Crimea; tension in the East and South China Seas; and in the Baltics region.
- 3) The hypocrisy of national self-interest: This means that the necessary political will is often missing. Individual states will proclaim their support but block progress.
- 4) Authoritarian regimes need an external threat to rally the masses at home. Other countries will also back tyrants if they think these tyrants favour "their side". While militaries must consider the worst case, diplomats are concerned with the best-case scenario.
- 5) Military-industrial complex: Defense industries remain amoral – more beholden to investors than ethics. For governments, it's jobs and votes.
- 6) Root cause injustices that breed war: It is difficult to change man's proclivity to violence, power, and aggression.

¹² <http://peacemagazine.org/archive/v06n4p08.htm>

¹³ Metta Centre of Non-Violence

So how do we address these impediments? We must strengthen international organizations, we work towards tension reduction, confidence building, and removing the injustices that breed war.

Tom Collina said that one role that Canada can play, particularly in the current climate, is to push against the unilateralism coming from the US. And the greatest danger with North Korea is not that it would attack the US or Canada directly, but that we may stumble into war. It is far too easy for miscalculations to happen.

The disarmament groups in Washington believe there is no military solution to the crisis with North Korea (DPRK) – and that all military options are bad. The government in Pyongyang will starve its people rather than give up its nuclear program. Diplomacy is therefore the only way forward, but at this point “the US is only willing to talk to North Korea if it is willing to give up its entire nuclear program.” The first goal of talks should be confidence-building. Both countries need to understand how the other will react. After confidence-building, there are other potential policies:

1. **Freeze for freeze:** DPRK stops nuclear and missile tests. The US would also have to give something up. It could scale back on military exercises with South Korea, but this must happen soon.¹⁴
2. [Some in] Congress are trying to put limitations on what President Trump can do in terms of first-use. The image of Trump, with his finger on the nuclear button, is one of the best motivators for finding a solution, and a great way to engage with the public.
3. Create policy so that the President cannot initiate nuclear war without support of the US Congress.
4. Others are attempting to craft legislation so that President Trump cannot initiate any military activity against North Korea without Congress.

Other concerns include that President Trump is jeopardizing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)¹⁵, which is a useful and effective nuclear technology agreement between key states and Iran. Instead, he is moving in the direction of turning Iran into another North Korea. It is unclear what Iran and the European partners would do next [if Trump decertifies the Iran deal].

Adding to concerns, the US is investing \$1-1.5T in rebuilding and modernizing its nuclear weapon arsenal over the next 30 years.

Discussion

There should be efforts to gain as many ratifications of the new **nuclear ban treaty** as quickly as possible. However, Grinius said that he was skeptical about the effectiveness of the TPNW. For one thing, what will the global security mechanism look like without

¹⁴ <https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2017-09-05/us-rejects-chinas-freeze-for-freeze-plan-for-north-korea>

¹⁵ The JCPOA is an agreement between Iran, the P5, Germany and the EU.

nuclear weapons? We need to have a credible conversation about what happens next before rushing to conclusions.

North Korea's behaviour may be outrageous, but it is also rational and is about regime survival. They're not going to give up their nuclear weapons, Grinius said, and we need to be realistic about that. China also needs to recognize that North Korea is a strategic liability. However, China doesn't want reunification of the Koreas – they have some ideological affinity with the North. China and the US (along with Japan and South Korea) need to have honest conversations about “what they want to do with the Korean peninsula.” People have been betting on the North Korea regime failing for decades – but Collina thinks they will survive and not go away, and will have to be accommodated. **The 3+3 proposal** advocates that South Korea and Japan give up the nuclear option, including reliance on nuclear states, and in turn North Korea would give theirs up. For this to happen, though, they all would require security guarantees from Russia, China, and the US – and this would probably also include officially ending the Korean War. North Korea is showing interest, and there is parliamentary support in Tokyo and Seoul. The Mongolian President has offered to host talks. However, North Korea is trying to practice classic nuclear deterrence, thinking that this is the only way Kim Jong-Un can avoid ending up like Gaddafi or Saddam Hussein.

One attendee suggested that more egregious than North Korea's tests is the **deployment of THAAD** (theatre missile defence) in South Korea, and ongoing US/South Korean naval exercises and war games. But if THAAD can prevent missiles coming from North Korea, Grinius responded, is it such a bad thing? The more you see fear brewing over North Korea, Collina said, the more that becomes the gateway into a public conversation about nuclear weapons. **The ban treaty, however, doesn't resonate well in the US** because it's seen as such a distant prospect, but internationally it has broader support.

How can we elevate the value and the role of the **OSCE**¹⁶ – without it, we would probably have a full-scale war with Russia, Ukraine and NATO. However, Russia doesn't like having [OSCE] observers in Ukraine.

Do you have any ideas about how we can better engage the next generation and use their votes?

Several leading civil society groups in Canada submitted a brief into the Defence review process, entitled “**A Shift to Sustainable Peace and Common Security**,”¹⁷ Peggy Mason said. As a shift, it needs to be worked at on many levels, but really it prioritizes the UN vision. Common security is the UN vision of security for all states based on international law and cooperative approaches. Countries all give lip service to these ideals, of course, but they do not put them at the centre of their defence policies. Nevertheless, that's the main shift that needs to happen. Grinius said he thought that in

¹⁶ Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

¹⁷ The statement (The Group of 78 and Rideau Institute, editors) was updated in 2018 as a standalone document: <https://www.ceasefire.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/2018-Update-A-Shift-to-Sustainable-Peace-and-Common-Security.pdf>

the Canadian context, you can't have a defense policy review without first putting a foreign policy review in place. In the end, Foreign Minister Freeland's comments were insubstantial and overall the defence review was not what it needed to be.

Panel 3:

Achieving and Sustaining Common Security: Key Elements

Moderator: Tamara Lorincz, Canadian Voice of Women for Peace

Panelist: Peter Langille, Sustainable Common Security and UNEPS

Panelist: Paul Meyer, Former Ambassador for Disarmament

Panelist: Branka Marijan, Project Ploughshares

We share diverse global challenges yet lack an organizing principle to pull civil society together, **Peter Langille** said. There is an interest in building bridges between disarmament, environmentalism, equality, and other campaigns, but our peace movement is relatively small and aging.

The umbrella concept of sustainable common security, might help as a unifying one-world perspective, a global culture of peace, and a **movement of movements**.¹⁸

Nuclear weapons abolition is unlikely, Langille said, without military transformation and economic conversion plans. “A United Nations Emergency Peace Service(UNEPS), while seldom viewed as a disarmament initiative, has the potential to improve peace operations, become a step towards global peace, and act as a pre-requisite for wider disarmament.”

The Global Peace Index reported a 10-year decline in peacefulness and the annual cost of war at a staggering US\$13.6 trillion. We are moving into an era of conflict where the traditional thinking on national security via military methods and deterrence simply hasn't worked and won't work. John Burroughs hit on our dilemma: "the abolition of nuclear weapons will not be possible so long as nuclear deterrence holds sway as an alleged means of defense" to ensure peace and security.

How might we generate the confidence and cooperation for a big shift? Can we identify the better, safer, more cost-effective options? And if we don't like the risks of nuclear deterrence and we don't like the costs of major build up in conventional deterrence, what might work?

We observe that national security approaches are proving counter productive. More war is expected even if it entails absurd costs and risks. We don't have a peace movement comparable to the 1980s.

So we need to build bridges and network, but how is this possible if **there is no unifying idea, no organizing principle, and no shared vision?**

Paradigm shifts occur when prevailing systems are deemed inadequate or failing and when another option is widely viewed as better.”

The Oxford Research Group (ORG) has identified four interconnected trends likely to lead to substantial global and regional instability and large-scale loss of life:

¹⁸ Langille began by stating he was pleased that a few important common security ideas were included in the joint Group of 78 and Rideau Institute statement for the defense policy review.

- Climate change
- Competition for scarce resources
- Marginalization of the majority world
- Global militarization including nuclear weapons

Langille said that we should look seriously at ORG’s sustainable security approach which shifts the emphasis towards **long-term consequences** of our policies. Fighting the symptoms will not work sufficiently. Common security, in contrast, provides a blueprint for survival, which helped during the last Cold War to stop provocative deployments, calm tensions, and cut both nuclear and conventional arsenals. **A common security approach** relies on deeper cooperation, empathy, and mutual respect for the golden rule: Treat others, as you would wish to be treated.

Langille proposed a synthesis of sustainable security and common security. **Sustainable common security** is synonymous with positive peace, and can challenge the narrative of national security and nuclear deterrence.

One military transformation and conversion plan, a component of sustainable common security is the **United Nations Emergency Peace Service (UNEPS)**. A project of the World Federalist Movement – Canada, it is derived from a former Liberal government’s study of rapid deployment options.¹⁹

“With the UN always on a shoe string budget, and now facing further cuts, there is little prospect of rapid, reliable, responses to ethnic cleansing in Myanmar, to mass atrocities in Burundi and Central African Republic and South Sudan etc. And as a result, violent conflicts tend to escalate and spread, then demand larger, longer, costlier operations.

“With a UN standing, 911 first-responder for complex emergencies, the UN would finally have a rapid, reliable capacity to help fulfill four of its tougher assigned tasks, with military, police and civilian teams”. This can limit armed conflict and mass atrocity crimes; protect civilians at extreme risk; ensure prompt start-up of demanding peace operations; and address human needs where others either can’t or won’t.

UNEPS will complement existing arrangements with a standing emergency service, a gender-equitable composition, and highly trained, well equipped, UN-hired personnel.

PAUL MEYER, Former Ambassador for Disarmament; Adjunct Professor, Simon Fraser University and Senior Fellow, The Simons Foundation

Machiavelli, **Paul Meyer** reminded us, developed a formula for ensuring the security of the state and to avoid war. But “we must see our project as progressively lessening the

¹⁹ Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations, 1995:
http://worldfederalistscanada.org/programdocs/UNEPSfiles/RR_eng2.pdf

risks to humanity” until we have “a cooperative security regime in which war is no longer thinkable”.

Myer said that a shift “at least in the short to near term” will require **conventional military capability** “to facilitate the transition from a policy of nuclear deterrence, to one of conventional deterrence.” As with Machiavelli’s advice, deterrence renders a state difficult to conquer and less likely to be the target of aggression. To some degree the requirements for conventional deterrence already exist.

We see that non-nuclear weapons states are not deterred from engaging in conflict with nuclear-armed states. Military tasks are often carried out by precision-guided conventional weapons systems.

There is pressure building in some nuclear armed states to find cost-effective, conventional and more practical alternatives to nuclear weapons.²⁰ Now cyber weapons, with capacity for mass disruption, have arrived. Non-nuclear, military options are increasing in quantity and quality. But ultimately weapons are symptoms of insecurity. Shifting away from nuclear arms also requires **reduction in threat perceptions** and better interstate cooperation.

One prohibition against war was the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, a multilateral accord that began with only 15 parties, and then 60 state parties by 1939. They agreed to "renounce war as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another."

The United Nations Charter prohibits the threat or use of force, and requires peaceful settlement of disputes. It establishes a judicial arm for adjudicating disputes between states through the International Court of Justice. “That element of the collective security vision of the founders has only been partially implemented. To advance a cooperative security system on the basis of what exists will require investments in both the political and military dimensions of international relations,” Myer said. Reforms are still needed in order to render institutions such as the Security Council more equitable, effective, and legitimate. But regional and sub-regional organizations do exist, including the OSCE, the African Union, the Organization of African States, ASEAN, and other bodies. Diplomatic engagement is mightier than the sword. The toolkit is full. We must utilize it!

We need to promote cooperative security approaches. Even during the Cold War we saw the development of contending defense alliances, but also agreements between the leading armed camps towards war prevention measures. Arms control restricted weapons and their deployment and limited the actual conduct of armed forces.

With time, confidence building measures become codified in a set of multilateral agreements. The Stockholm Conference of 1986, The Vienna documents of 1999 and

²⁰ In the UK the Trident ballistic submarine force has been debated. See for instance Robert Green’s article “Jeremy Corbyn is Right to Reject Trident”: http://www.theecologist.org/blogs_and_comments/commentators/2986188/jeremy_corbyn_is_right_to_reject_trident.html

2011, had their origins in the 1975 Helsinki Act, and these were complemented by the Open Skies Treaty of 1992 that provided for cooperative aerial surveillance. The IMF agreement of 1987 and the CFE of Europe in 1989 resulted in significant reduction and destruction of offensive weapons systems.

Myer said that as part of a revitalized cooperative security system, the arms control regime needs to be revived and reinforced. A mix of diplomatic and military measures provides an environment where cooperative approaches can take root and flourish. This will be a longer term undertaking, but even in the near term, a mix of credible conventional defense, active arms control and conflict prevention diplomacy will facilitate the transition to the post MAD world we all seek.

**Panelist: Branka Marijan, Project Ploughshares:
“Security of Being: Stability and Identity Issues”**

Branka Marijan pointed out that in the Middle East, notions of common security and cooperation might have less credence. Countries such as Bosnia have had less than perfect experiences with the UN. “Some of these supranational organizations don't step up in time” and they don't have the capabilities to do so.

There is also existential fear, the idea that the countries that have experienced genocide, great chaos and upheaval, will always fear for the existence of their own nation and community because of their history and by being at the receiving end of superpower influence.

They are not blank slates, and any proposed alternative must work with current realities.

People need to have their national and their ethnic identities respected, including their perceptions of themselves as secure and stable. Even the North Koreans see themselves as self-reliant and independent, and this has now become tied to their nuclear program. So then suggestions are made that China should step in and resolve the nuclear issue. While the North Korean leader may not care about his people, the people still retain the self-perception that they are willing to sacrifice themselves. Marijan underlined that we must remember that “any alternative conceptualization of security cannot be a one size fits all formula.” In the Caribbean, for example, current security threats aren't from other countries in the neighbourhood, but environmental degradation and climate change. We need to recognize that there are multiple ways to engage with different actors when it comes to the concept of common security.

Discussion: The term ‘security’ is highly contested, and has become highly militarized, one person suggested. Olaf Palme’s common security Commission and Report are not well known here in Canada. They’ve been usurped by NATO's ‘collective security’ language. Better perhaps is the term ‘common security and common humanity’. Others felt the word ‘security’ continues to be a good one but should be expanded beyond the narrow military sphere. Security is health, it also involves freedom from invasion of your cyber space, and many other things. We need to talk about security of the environment,

and public health with respect to catastrophes that could occur, such as new pandemics, famine and climate change, cyber-attacks, and security from a nuclear power reactor meltdown.

Who then has to bite if there is to be change? Is it the UN? Civil society? Is it the US? Is there an actor without whom this transformation will not be possible? And does identity transcend national borders? Are there group-think mentalities that are obstacles to a post-MAD world?

Actors that can mobilize effectively are the ones who will bite. They include those who were behind the humanitarian movement, such as Ireland, Norway, Austria, and Mexico. They also remind us of the power of an idea, and that of skilful diplomacy. With these components we can change the paradigm. With the right intervention, there can be a disproportionate effect on reality and even modest powers can have significant impact.

Citizens, leaders and opinion makers must transcend their historical narratives and perceived injustices, because we are unlikely to have ideal reconciliation. We can't succumb to too narrow a definition of identity with all the historical baggage and grievance and resentment involved -- if we are to move forward.

Identity is both a challenge and an opportunity. There are transitional identities where people can build common security discussions. The transitional identities may especially be shared by youth. Many people have long memories. Didn't we all think right wing populism and nationalism was passé? But it has been shown that it most certainly is not.

Who has to bite? We all do. We are still functioning on a model from 35 years ago. Leaders need viable, compelling, and widely appealing plans. And at the moment, for military transformation and economic conversion we have much homework to do. If there is a focus for research, that's what we have to bite on. We have to find another way to compel change amongst our decision makers. We've got to think as civil servants do, and find new tools and new strategies.

In the case of the landmines campaign, suddenly it was seen as a weapon that was incompatible with humanitarian law. There were also living victims of antipersonnel mines. NGOs and development experts now could speak not only about the medical impact but also the impact on developmental goals. There were celebrities involved, but the discourse was also fact-based. The nuclear weapon disarmament story lacks many of those elements. This is a weapon, however horrendous, that was only ever used twice and we are now three generations removed from direct experience. So these are all challenges. To win over public opinion, we need to be creative to hook the audience. We talk about humanity, and common security frameworks, but we still need to focus more on the human element.

Nuclear winter did a lot to mobilize people in the 1980s. Numbers still matter, and if you can put millions of people in the street, as we saw with the Cold War, you can influence

governments: For resistance but also by calling for a more just world. We don't have the resources we need, they reside with billionaires. We need the numbers.

It is very simple to ban nuclear weapons if that's all you have to do, and on the other hand there's complexity if you have to change the entire security system. To get to a common security result how do we choose between the naively simple and the overwhelmingly difficult?

There are alternatives in-between which offer a start – UNEPS might be one of these. They might move us towards the global peace system.

The world needs positive nationalism. Positive nationalism is the glue that holds a society together. If we put ourselves in Russian shoes we see the build-up of NATO forces along our borders as threatening. Some among our supporters may argue against the continuation of NATO, or Canadian membership within it.

We also know very few wars end on the battlefield, they end through political diplomatic settlements in one form or another. We should be actively promoting that in official and unofficial circles. Even during the worst days of the Cold War there were still active channels between the Soviet Union and the United States. With Mr. Putin, who has Russian interests in mind, there is an opportunity for cooperative arrangements regarding Ukraine: The Minsk agreement. Putin has been heavily demonized and boxed in. It's worth recalling that as much as many don't like the guy, back in 2014 in the Baltic context he had a fairly progressive pitch for a new world order.

We are seeing a gradual shift towards a more progressive internationalism. A one-world perspective is developing that also respects diversity and individual nations and identity, and this has to be encouraged.

Panel 4 – Canadian Leadership for Common Security

Moderator: Ernie Regehr, Senior Fellow at The Simons Foundation

**Panelist: Tariq Rauf, Former Head of Verification and Security Policy
Coordination, International Atomic Energy Agency**

**Panelist: Peggy Mason, Former Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament; President,
Rideau Institute**

Tariq Rauf said that Canada traditionally took a strong position into meetings on disarmament and non-proliferation but over time our disarmament focus has eroded. Canadians need to ask whether we need to still be as invested in EU-Atlantic thinking as during the Cold War. Those policies are still mired in the past and rely on nuclear weapons. But none of the security challenges facing NATO and Canada are solvable using nuclear weapons.

- Instead the Canadian government would be wise to re-activate their **consultative group**, as this would provide a much broader security perspective.
- Canada should think about **advocating for an Arctic Security Council**. Being heavily invested in NATO means we don't have enough resources to look after our own backyard, including the Arctic. And yet there is no forum to discuss a nuclear free Arctic.
- Canada could call for a **review process** to evaluate the status of the new prohibition treaty against nuclear weapons.
- We could establish an NPT youth group, for those aged 35 and under, which provides funding and an opportunity to publish articles.
- Canada could help **facilitate a meeting over the crisis in North Korea**.
- It is **the responsibility of the middle powers to bring some reform to the Security Council**. If Canada were to have a non-permanent seat at the Security Council, what would it be used for? The big 5 are the largest possessors of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. They are the five biggest exporters of conventional arms, and they are given the authority under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter to be responsible for International Peace and Security.

Panelist: Peggy Mason, Former Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament, Rideau Institute

Peggy Mason said the “Getting to Nuclear Zero Conference” came out of a whole year of work, and of networks coming together, a working group of 4 or 5 NGOs, and in the end pulling together a larger group of NGOs to formulate a document that was submitted to the defence policy review: “A shift to sustainable peace and common security”.²¹ The key paradigm shift it called for was sustainable common security to establish positive peace. It's no longer "I maintain my security by threatening yours" but instead the UN vision of common security.

²¹ Updated in 2018: <https://www.ceasefire.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/2018-Update-A-Shift-to-Sustainable-Peace-and-Common-Security.pdf>

"With no direct threat to Canadian territory", she said, and with no nuclear weapons, we are in an enviable position. We have Machiavelli's non-threatening position, as far as North Korea is concerned. We should expand the emphasis on non-war, and pro-peaceful conflict resolution, and give priority to building the UN as envisioned by its Charter.

And if we are going to talk about recourse to the UN, we need to talk about strengthening the UN itself.

Paul Rogers of Bradford University, has said repeatedly that we need to reinvent our counter-terrorism strategy, and focus on the rule of law. Short term tactical wars on terror have proven to be counter-productive. Currently we have 'Wack a Mole', but when in a hole you must stop digging. The civil society statement that we produced has a prescription on how to do this, and goes into specific proposals that Canada can take up.

One of these that Peter Langille has written about, is UNEPS. We need a timely, professional, effective response geared to prevention.

This project alone will be huge, recognizing that the UN will be given the responsibility to respond. R2P was highly promoted by the major powers, and has been used for regime change. If it were a UNEPS going in, on the other hand, it would be difficult to enable that kind of hi-jacking.

The UN has as part of its mandate the protection of civilians in imminent danger, but it also lacks resources. There has been no doctrine developed, and instead it has mostly been ad-hoc. It is an extraordinary large mindset change to go from war fighting to protection and prevention. Therefore we can't overstate the impact of that one change - towards a UNEPS. What can Canada do? **We can support this very important initiative.**

We also need to build up the OSCE, which has been terribly underfunded

If we focus back on UN peacekeeping, we see Canada has been missing in action for 10 years, and therefore no institutional knowledge is left here for what has become infinitely more complex. We need to **rebuild a Canadian peacekeeping center under civilian auspices** providing civilian military and police training of Canadians and of other UN Peacekeeping forces.

Diplomatic capacity needs to be rebuilt.

We believe that Canada should establish an expert, arms-length non-partisan **domestic Institute for Sustainable Peace and Common security** with long-term financial viability. And in that way, the government is able to harness civil society and academic expertise and build up a research base.

Revive the North Pacific cooperative security dialogue: Canada was the only country with multilateral experience in this initiative. Starting with track 2, government officials and academic experts were trying to launch a dialogue where none had existed before,

and where the government funded university research. North Korea didn't participate in the US's version of this, but they participated in ours.

Discussion

If you want to have an impact in an international arena, you need to have good ideas and good process. Sustain them until you get results. We have examples that need to be revived. Should we shift away from North Atlantic-European focus and shift more towards Arctic security? The two are not mutually exclusive; there are also other regions of the world where we now can be involved.

We need think tanks and civil society along with academia to try and turn to the problems of the Asia Pacific, along with integrated work through CIDA: We need the kind of investment to sustain this and help build the connection with civil society.

How do we use leverage of the current government feminist agenda and the feminist assistance policy towards a common security agenda? What does a feminist foreign policy really look like?

We have a government that is championing getting women involved in the peace processes but there aren't any peace processes. The UN vision is putting prevention and sustainable peace as priorities and that is a feminist policy. Trudeau's feminism is a faux feminism, one attendee said, it only serves to lubricate Canada's misogynistic militarism.

Is the document "The shift to sustainable peace and common security" too tepid? We need a new and bold transformative document that is premised on nonviolence and human rights, social justice, and environmental safety. Peggy said the submission to the defence review was the right groundwork. "We will need to go much further, we need a paradigm shift." If the government were to set up a peace institute with a mandate to carry forward the vision of sustainable common security, then we could move more quickly.

If the UNEPS concept is "too drastic" for the government today then they can at least salvage something on the peacekeeping side, and in support of funding of the International Peacekeeping Training Centres so that developing countries can participate in them.

International Law is another obvious objective needing enhancement, but the government appears to be running away from the ICC's attempt to get aggression to be an international crime.

Funding is too skewed to National Defence at the university level, including the Innovation for Defence Excellence and Security (IDEAS) program. Even when the government reduced its foreign affairs budget it continued to fund defense institutes in each of the 10 provinces. The scholars coming out of those programs are encouraged to support a narrow policy agenda for defense. The diplomacy voice is missing. The Foreign

Affairs Department has been reduced, and is no longer championing foreign policy; it has become more of a trade department. **We need to restore the balance and restore the diplomatic component.**

Canadian policy with its **NATO central focus locks Canada** into the orthodoxy of NATO on security questions. Canada lacks an independent foreign policy think tank. We have a three-ocean border; we are a multi-cultural country. We are much more liberal than many other countries, we have already invested a lot in the UN, in peacekeeping, in global governance. It is imperative to encourage our own youth to do this kind of intellectual thinking.

Canada can organize a high-level summit on nuclear weapons and related issues, and develop discussion on arms flows in conflict regions.

If we're serious about eliminating nuclear weapons **should we eliminate nuclear power as well?** Can the material left over from nuclear power plants be then enriched and used for weapons? The issue of nuclear power is a very contentious issue and there are very strong views on all sides. However, no nuclear weapon state has made weapons from a civilian nuclear power program. All nuclear weapons have come from dedicated nuclear weapons programs. 11% of the world's power is generated from nuclear power plants. Nuclear waste is an issue but some believe that nuclear power is needed if we are to meet our sustainable environmental goals of the Paris Accord. For the foreseeable future, nuclear energy will be with us.

Isn't a nuclear weapon coming from North Korea a threat to us all? There is no direct threat, but there is an indirect threat if a missile were launched, and of it going astray. However, for North Korea to launch that missile is to commit suicide. Their actions and rhetoric are intended to deter the United States and that's why we need to get off the bellicose language and the heightened rhetoric that can get out of hand, and lead to miscalculation and to the unthinkable. Instead, we must focus on diplomacy.

There is a specific offer to the US to discuss the North Korea nuclear program provided the US remove its own threatening posture and sanctions advocacy. And statistics show that the DPRK economy has also grown by 1.1%. The policy of sanctions mostly punishes the population. There has not been a single reversal of a nuclear weapons program through sanctions. Not in South Africa, Israel, India, Libya, Iran, or Iraq. But when there is a shortage of thinking on policy options, nearly everyone rushes to sanctions.

There is a reconciliation effort to bring 25 women from North Korea, South Korea, the US and Canada to the Korean peninsula, but it will need approval from the Canadian government for visas.

De-nuclearization of the Arctic is linked to global de-nuclearization. In the meantime, we should welcome measures that reduce and prevent provocative exercises with ballistic

missiles and attack submarines going at each other. That includes the Americans going into the Russian zone in the Arctic.

Do you think there is more than a 50/50 chance that we can avoid nuclear conflict in the future? Yes, if we focus on diplomacy. But while we don't know the certain answer to that question, we need to act as if the danger is imminent.

FINAL REMARKS: ROY CULPEPER CHAIR OF THE GROUP OF 78

The extreme peril and dangers to which we are exposed at the current conjuncture, **Roy Culpeper** said, include at least the \$1.5 trillion modernization program in nuclear armaments undertaken by the nuclear powers. The perils of proliferation continue at many levels: The risks of miscalculation, of accident, regional conflagration, and risk of utilization of nuclear material by terrorist organizations. Each of these reminds us that urgent action is needed now.

There is this argument for not doing something because the time is not right. This is the principle of 'un-right time' -- that people should not act because the right moment has not yet arrived.

But the only argument for doing something is that it is the right thing to do. All other arguments are arguments for doing nothing.

North Korea's escalation of threats, and those by the US military through its military exercises, tighten the risk threshold. The Chinese have offered to play a diplomatic role in resolving this issue but they have made it very clear that the US should cease and desist from their military exercises so not to be viewed by the North Koreans as a threat to DPRK security. So there are a number of reasons to be pessimistic.

We should think about the ban treaty and its signatories as an avenue of discussion with the Canadian authorities, when we get a chance to talk to them. The 'feminist agenda' for international assistance sounds good on paper but it doesn't have one iota of extra resources, and it compares badly to the 73% extra resources dedicated to the defense budget over the next 10 years.

Canada can sign the new nuclear ban treaty and advocate for this in NATO rather than argue that being in NATO compromises our ability to do so. And there are those, including myself, who believe NATO does not actually perform a useful role. If anything it plays a rather negative and dangerous role in the world community today.

We need to seize the moment in terms of the ban treaty and connect that with issues of common security in the broad and comprehensive way our panels have done. If we are going to convince the Canadian government and others to move away from nuclear deterrence, **we need to show what is possible, and to put before them a case for moving toward sustainable common security.** This is articulated in the paper we wrote in 2016 and is what several panelists have talked about. And the more we can help our youth towards realizing these goals, the more we will discharge not only our parental duties, but also our global responsibilities.