



## **CHALLENGE AND CHANGE**

### **TO CANADA'S FOREIGN POLICY: 1981 - 2001**

**Report of the 20<sup>TH</sup> Anniversary Annual Policy Conference of the  
Group of 78 - Year 2001**

**September 21-23, 2001  
Cantley, Québec**

*"We can lead in this new era of conflict resolution but we must do it with new tools...  
There are nations in development that are screaming for this country to lead the world in  
regard to conflict resolution, to respect human life, to take the lead in fact, in  
proclaiming that every human is (fully) human".*

***Lt. General (ret.) Romeo Dallaire***

*"These behind-the-border issues of democracy, economic equity and sustainable  
development are the issues that will ultimately decide our future as Canadians. They are  
the proper subjects of a Canadian foreign policy that answers to our interests, and to our  
values as citizens of the world".*

***Maureen O'Neil***

*"I hope the Group can urge the government, which doesn't know what its vital interests  
are, and say: 'Look, you have an international mission and you always have had, and we  
are one of the few countries that can pursue this activity of bringing about, where we can,  
compromise and persuading our great neighbour to act multilaterally' ".*

***Geoffrey Pearson***

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## Acknowledgments

Our first vote of thanks goes to the speakers, panelists and moderators whose contributions made this year's Group of 78 policy conference such a success. They are introduced with brief biographical notes in the executive summary.

The Group is also greatly indebted to those members who helped to organize and run the conference, which this year drew 76 people, including 67 members. In particular, we would like to thank:

*Conference Rapporteur:* Clyde Sanger

*Conference Co-ordinator:* Corey Levine

*Members of the Conference Coordinating Committee:* Debbie Grisdale, Geoffrey Pearson (co-chairs); Tim Creery, Nancy Drozd, Michael Shenstone, Arch MacKenzie, Clovis Demers and Dwight Fulford.

*G78 Treasurer and All-around Guru:* Nancy Drozd

*Conference Report Editors:* Arch MacKenzie, Corey Levine, Tim Creery

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*Production Editor:* Corey Levine

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Debbie Grisdale and Geoffrey Pearson

Conference Co-Chairs

## Executive Summary

### Speakers and Topics

Since this year's conference marked the 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the forming of the Group of 78, the theme virtually chose itself. The title, "Change and Challenge to Canadian Foreign Policy 1981-2001", was conceived not only to encompass the three inter-related objectives for Canadian foreign policy the original members of Group set out (peace and security, economic equity, global governance) but also a new objective - protection of the environment. The adding of this category reflects the emergence of environmental issues, especially global warming, as crucial to planetary survival.

While the conference was originally planned as a forward looking event with a healthy dollop of nostalgia, it took place less than two weeks after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon in Washington. Needless to say these tragic events had a heavy impact on the conference and the speakers' presentations.

#### Keynote Speeches

The conference featured two keynote speakers. **Lt. General (ret.) Romeo Dallaire** gave the opening keynote address at the Friday evening dinner. Gen. Dallaire is currently the Advisor to the Minister of CIDA with regard to war affected children. In 1993 he was appointed Head of the UN Observer Mission - Uganda and Rwanda (UNOMUR) and later the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR).

Gen. Dallaire spoke of the need to find new ways of addressing the conflicts breaking out in the world today and offered a critique of both the problems and solutions and the important role in conflict resolution that Canada can play on the international stage today. He was eloquent and inspiring and received a standing ovation from the audience.

The other Keynote Speaker was **Maureen O'Neil**, President of the International Development Research Centre. She developed the thesis that globalization could have good or ill effects, depending on the prior ability of national governments to provide good governance at their own level.

#### Panel Discussions

The conference also featured four panels, all held in plenary session.

The first panel discussion, **Looking Back and Looking Ahead**, which was moderated by **Ann Gertler**, was comprised of three founding members of the Group of 78:

**Murray Thomson**, the founding Director of Peacefund Canada and a recent recipient of the Order of Canada, not only explained why those precise 78 people were approached to

become members, but added his strong plea that the eradication of nuclear weapons was as much a priority today as in 1981.

**Gordon Fairweather**, a former MP, was the first Chief Commissioner of the Canadian Human Rights Commission as well as founding Chairman of the Immigration and Refugee Board. He spoke of the founding objectives of the Group of 78 in the context of the world today and the priorities both domestically and internationally including, the reform of the UN, the militarization of space, and the growing movement of peoples in the world.

**Marion Dewar**, political activist and former Mayor of Ottawa, reflected on the fact that the Group of 78 founding generation felt connected to the political process and thus were able to mobilize to create the Group of 78, but how the current generation has been deprived of similar avenues of expression and thus of the importance of the Group of 78 to connect with youth today.

**Richard Harmston**, Executive Director of South Asia Partnership (SAP), and **Gerry Barr**, President and CEO of the Canadian Council for International Co-operation (CCIC), complemented each other in the session on **Economic Equity**, which was chaired by Marion Dewar.

Richard focused on the development assistance side of the issue. He traced both the good and bad changes in aid policies (a cheer for the emergence of the social sector as centrepiece, a rebuke for the shrinking volume).

Gerry tackled the issue of trade liberalisation and its impact on the Global South in terms of a growing disparity. He offered some timely solutions for development programs in general and the WTO specifically in which to address this disparity.

The panel on the **Environment** was chaired by **Geoffrey Bruce**.

**Charles Caccia**, M.P. (Davenport) and Chair of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development, gave a sober account of the lack of progress to reduce our dependence on oil, our need to focus on alternative forms of energy and energy consumption and pointed out how little was ever said about the advantages (rather than the costs) of energy conservation.

**Dr. John Last**, a medical doctor, university professor and epidemiologist, put on Old Testament robes to elaborate (in a remarkably cheerful way for the Doomsday prophet he claimed to be) on the disastrous effects of climate change, the impact of these changes on public health and the issues that need to be addressed in order to mitigate the consequences of climate change.

**Clovis Demers** chaired the panel on Global Governance.

The first speaker, **Michael Oliver**, former president and Vice Chancellor of Carleton University, has written or edited books several books on the politics of Quebec and Canada. He spoke of how the policies of the major powers had pushed the United Nations down to a tertiary - rather than just a secondary - position in addressing conflicts, and called for "a coalition for action through the United Nations" of middle-power states.

**Christine Parsons**, a staff member at the UN Association of Canada (UNAC), spoke of her experience at the recent World Conference on Racism in Durban, South Africa. As the youngest panelist by a few decades, she also answered Marion Dewar's lament of the morning - "How are we going to dream together?" - by declaring that her generation was eager to get connected and dream in practical terms of a better world.

For the final panel on **Peace and Security**, **Geoffrey Pearson** recalled the comparable dangers of 1981, seen from his Moscow vantage-point as the then Canadian ambassador, with today in light of the Sept.11 terrorist attacks and warned of the dangers if the Russia-United States standoff over reduction of nuclear stockpiles in return for reviewing the ABM treaty was not resolved.

The chair of the panel, **Corey Levine**, stepped into the gap left by the cancellation of Ernie Regehr because of the need to tend to post-Sept.11 events, and spoke of what she thought the terrorist attacks will mean for peace and security in the international community.

### **Conclusions and Proposals**

The tragic events of Sept.11 provided the backdrop and the framework not only to the presentations but also made the ensuing discussions all the more acute. Below is the outcome of these discussions in the form of proposed resolutions adopted by the members at the conference and a letter that was sent to Prime Minister Jean Chretien.

#### *Resolutions and Recommendations:*

The Group of 78,

Appreciating the courageous behaviour and foresight of General Dallaire in alerting the United Nations to the threat of genocide in Rwanda in 1993-94, and in commanding the United Nations forces there in 1994 during appallingly hazardous days;

And admiring his moral and intellectual as well as physical resilience in devoting his years of retirement to analysing the security threats in a new era, and propounding innovative views on conflict resolution;

Resolves;

To start the process of nominating General Dallaire for the Nobel Peace Prize

Note: This initiative came from the Other Romeo - Romeo Maione, who said he would go on a cross-Canada speaking tour for such an objective.

Submitted by Clyde Sanger

1. Whereas war is an unsatisfactory method of settling disputes in the Twenty-First Century;

Be it resolved that the Group of 78 urges an up-date of the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact making war illegal.

Note: Mr Kellogg was U.S. Secretary of State, and M. Briand was French Foreign Minister.

Submitted by Ross Smyth

2. Resolved;

That the Group of 78 contact NGOs, Trade Unions, the Churches, Mosques and Synagogues of Canada, and other similar organizations with a special emphasis on youth groups, to:

- Prepare a manifesto calling for the centering of international peace action and anti-terrorist responses through the United Nations.
- Set up an inter-organization planning committee for a large rally in support of the reinstatement and reinforcement of the United Nations so that it can act promptly and effectively in the defense of our Common Security.

Submitted by Michael Oliver

Resolved:

- That the federal government increase the Canadian contribution to the Global Health Fund and authorize the use of Canadian contributions for the purchase of generic products, wherever produced.

Submitted by Dwight Fulford.

2. Resolved:

- That Canada move at the present time to restore the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security as an instrument for research and for promoting the many tasks of building a culture of peace, and provide CIIPS with sufficient funds to include grant-giving powers to independent institutions.

· That Canada actively promote the campaign of The Hague Appeal for Peace, for universal peace education at all levels adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, November 1999.

Submitted by Janis Alton, Hannah Newcombe, Marie-Hélène Boyle-Courtemanche, Debbie Grisdale.

3. The responsibility for the attacks of September 11 rests primarily with those who carried them out. But there is a further responsibility held by the governments in the region where the terrorists are thought to originate. They are broadly unrepresentative of their people, and have not given priority to the basic welfare and needs of their populations. Part of the international response should be to analyze the political and social character of that region, and offer appropriate support for the bringing about of more representative and responsible regimes.

Submitted by Ted English

### ***KEYNOTE SPEECH: FOUR REVOLUTIONS***

#### **LIEUTENANT-GENERAL (RET.) ROMEO DALLAIRE**

We are in an era that is rich in opportunities for advancing the human race. It is also very dangerous because we are risking a regression to an era of oppression even within the democratic states, as we close borders and try to weed out elements of our nation. In particular, we as a nation of immigrants could start a process that will provide nothing positive but leave us with an impression that we are living in insecurity, in which we will develop a siege mentality. That outcome is quite possible.

I will try to touch upon the different policy themes that you are going to be reviewing: global security, economics, environmental policy and of course world governance, using an experiential base of information and not necessarily an academic base.

I am going to use the post-Cold War era as the stepping-stone into the next decades. The post-Cold War brought four revolutions upon Canadians; and the rest of the Western world has experienced them in different degrees.

#### **1. A revolution in conflict resolution:**

First, there was a revolution in the whole concept of conflict and of war. We had a hiatus with the Gulf War, which temporarily proved that all our theories of the Cold War worked and which used classic warfare and all the sophisticated weapons systems that had been developed during that era. However, the Gulf War was an exceptional, unusual instrument of resolving conflict; over the last ten years we have found ourselves in far more complex scenarios with many more parameters than classic warfare. Although resisted by many of the Cold Warriors who wanted to hold on to all the Cold War instruments instead of adapting them, the scenario they have refused to face is that of

conflict resolution. We are not even into peace-keeping as such; we are into longer-term conflict resolution, trying to bring about a state of stability and development in nations that have for the last 150 years been under the colonial yoke and the influence of other people.

In the colonial era we went into many of those nations, creating them from scratch, often regardless of the people but very conscious of their resources and their geographic importance. We would normally support a group in those nations that seemed to have control, even if it was a minority group, even an oppressive group, in order to gain the benefits of these colonial empires and resources. Then, as the struggle against the colonial powers started with India and spread through Africa in the late 1950s and early 1960s, we found these people not automatically ruling in a democratic manner and not able to develop their own capacities and consciousness as a nation. Instead, they were cut off in the Cold War, where either superpower on a number of occasions put some very nasty people in charge. These nasty people held control in those areas as we continued to take strong actions to keep a balance of power and avoid a nuclear scenario in Europe.

Then in 1989 we suddenly turned around to many of these nations and said, "Listen, we really don't need you as such any more; so why don't you sort yourselves out?" Well, that's exactly what they are doing, sometimes with devastating effect. The result has been a proliferation of conflicts, and imploding nations that are attempting to grasp a form of democracy adapted for their cultures. In attempting to bring a certain level of stability and support - not doing it for them, not putting them under anybody's wing, but support - we have discovered that there are skill-sets that are wholly different from the classic security skill-sets that we have used in the past. We have, in fact, in the Western world moved into a fundamentally new role for the use of force.

The Treaty of Westphalia still exists, and the military is there to defend the borders of a nation-state and its interests overseas. The triumvirate of the government, the people and the military still exists. That is still a role that we expect to be conducted by our military forces and an arena in which our diplomatic corps will be involved: to do whatever you can do to avoid war but, if you have to go to war, then we envisage the defence of a nation being done by the military and through mobilization.

However, something else snuck in during the 1990s, and it is called conflict. Before then you had war, or Cold War preparations, and you had peace, peace-keeping; between these two there were very few actions taken involving the essential use of force. The Congo operation was one such action, Cyprus was another in the flare-up of 1974; but in NATO and for the Western world militaries, there was nothing there. You had to train for war, and whatever skills you had learnt there you could simply cascade them down to peace-keeping in the classic sense of Chapter 6 [of the UN Charter]. Both sides are tired of fighting each other, they are in their trenches and they need some sort of credible oversight in the implementing of their peace treaties.

Well, in the 1990s that whole middle area has filled up with conflict. And an entirely different scale in the use of force is required, as well as in the use of diplomatic skills and

of humanitarian instruments. Yet, in that middle area we have over the last decade either provided *ad hoc* responses or done a lot of on-the-job training. We were simply attempting to adapt Cold War methods to solving conflicts and to a complex, long-term involvement in nations which need to be nurtured with a variety of instruments and not just force, in order to permit them to advance. I am speaking of the diplomatic, political and humanitarian dimensions of the task, of security, the military, the police, and of the economic restructuring of these nations. The involvement is in nation-building and interfacing with a number of world organizations in order to bring a semblance of a plan to support those seeking to bring stability to their nations, helping in fact the moderates in many cases. We found ourselves deficient in those skill-sets needed in all these dimensions. In the 1990s we found ourselves wavering, attempting actions, succeeding in some, failing in others - and trying to learn lessons. Well, that new role of using all your capabilities as a nation in conflict resolution is here to stay. The era of the nation which is itself at peace but has its diplomats and humanitarian workers and its military and policemen in war zones is here to stay. It is very difficult politically for a nation to handle such altruistic ambitions and take casualties at the same time.

Over the last decade we have moved into those nations attempting to give them the support they need, using references of respect of human rights and moral values, maybe emphasizing the Judaeo-Christian aspect to it that we in the Western world have been observing for centuries. Now we are using force in our resolve to pursue such ideologies instead of for the defence of the nation. We have found that our military and a number of the structures are deficient in tackling this very different work. As part of the reform now begun in the military to handle this revolution of operations in conflict zones and humanitarian catastrophes, we are finding that we have to develop our people in areas like anthropology, philosophy and sociology. This, we hope, will help them grasp the complexities of the situations they face, and be able to be "value added" and not simply be there as a guard for the next two years. This new era is also demanding long-term involvement. Just as in development, you cannot bring about any solution in two or three years. You cannot meet the objective of giving the moderates scope to manoeuvre and grasp the processes of government for these nations to advance, if you are going to be there for [only] three years.

My mandate [in Rwanda] was two years. It created such pressures in negotiations and in trying to solve problems that it undermined the mandate. If you are going into these nations now, you are in for 40, maybe even 60 years. You have to formulate an integrated plan - not a military plan, not a humanitarian plan, not a diplomatic plan. For this, you must have people who are multi-skilled and multi-disciplined to build such a plan, where the use of the different skills and disciplines will vary as that attempt at stabilizing a country and reducing conflict evolves. That requires a whole new bag of tools.

To give you an example: there was a small NGO that was attempting to save lives of Rwandans during the genocide. They had a tent about the size of this room. A couple of doctors and a few nurses were going flat out, and at the tent door there were hundreds upon hundreds of Rwandans standing there, or lying there, waiting to get treatment. Canada, Australia and Britain had sent in big military field hospitals - we are talking of

hospitals that can handle 500 casualties a day. Now, those doctors and nurses and aides were in uniform and ran round with a big Red Cross sign; and they went up to this NGO and said, "Listen, we can do your triage. We can take some of these people by ambulance to the hospital. We can help you people do a better job." And they were literally thrown out of the tent. They were thrown out because of a philosophy of neutrality still prevailing: "We cannot as an NGO work with the military, because we will be compromised. We will let hundreds of people die but we must not be compromised." That basis of neutrality is *passé* and it is now even perverse. We must accept transparency, yes absolutely. But it is my belief, after working in the domain and conducting some research, that we are relying on all the wrong premises in trying to solve many of these conflicts.

We must be out there. We are a middle power with a grasp of technology and have a work ethic and a belief in fundamental values. We have no colonial past except for the destruction of our First Nations, which in many cases still continues - something for us not to forget. We can lead in this new era of conflict resolution, but we must do it with new tools. We have got to get rid of the *ad hoc* practices we have been using these last 10 years, and build a whole new conceptual base of what are the solutions for these complex mandates. [Beware of] any general who says to you, "We must not get involved in these missions until there are clear exit strategies, clear missions with very clear action verbs like we had in NATO." We spent 50 years ensuring that everybody [in NATO] knew what the word "attack" meant, or what "withdrawal" and "defence" meant. We are now into an era with broad and imprecise instructions and mandates like "establish an atmosphere of security"! Does that mean "while demobilization is going on and I will have to defend the nation, if some other nation decides to attack"? Does that mean that I take over all the security dimensions? Or does that mean that I just support the police? Support those armies? Just act as a buffer? What does "establish an atmosphere of security" mean? We don't even have the definition of the action verbs.

So, there is a whole new doctrinal, conceptual base required, because the missions will not be straightforward, and the mandates will not be simple to identify and to implement. Just look at how many changed mandates and fresh resolutions there have been in the Yugoslav campaign. Troops could not keep up with what was happening each week at the political level. Why are we always surprised when we carry out what we believe will be the solution, only to find that one of the two sides comes up with a new angle? Have we really pondered over these complex arenas of conflict and sorted out innovative ways to anticipate problems when working in the midst of ambiguity. [Can you picture] the military working in ambiguity? The diplomatic corps, no problem! But, for a soldier, a bit of a puzzle: "Where exactly am I supposed to point that rifle?"

What we have seen recently [in the attacks on New York and Washington] was not unpredictable. There has been a fair amount of literature and work done on the asymmetric threats to the Western world. Maybe this [form of attack] took us by surprise, but not the objective. [The attack was] not in our classic way of doing things. We in Canada have a small military because we are taking the risk of simply using the military in a possible war. The results of that risk we took are now coming home to roost. Why

are we caught off guard, instead of having evolved any integrated plans for this new arena of conflict? We have a crisis because we were not anticipatory and had not worked out solutions to this threat. It does not matter how good a solution to a crisis we may come up with - and rarely is it the right solution, for we either overkill or undershoot - for what has happened is that the mere fact of a crisis has created insecurity, has created a lack of confidence, has created an atmosphere of people looking behind their back. That is not the way to lead. That is not the way to advance a nation. You cannot do it by crisis management because, no matter what the solution is, you will have "lost feathers" because you got us into the crisis.

We have entered a new era where conflict is the norm, and where the use of force in different forms, as well as its integration with humanitarian work and different diplomatic efforts, needs a new set of rules and tools. We cannot live through the next decade and beyond with the attitude that we had in the past, of "let's try this, and let's try that and hopefully, it will work."

## **2. A revolution in resource management:**

We have gone now through a revolution in resources, or resource management. In accounting among nations and to their peoples in regard to using resources, we have discovered a massive problem in resource management globally. If we believe in all humans being human and accept that some are not more human than others, then we must also want the 80 percent who are close to or below the poverty line to reach a certain level where they can truly live as humans, and where they can meet the aspirations of their children and themselves to achieve a better shape of life. However, if the other 20 percent continue to burn up the resources, continues to follow policies that reduce the global resource base, then are we in fact truly committed to placing the human race on a more equitable basis, to pulling people out of poverty?

I am afraid we may give them some opportunities to start along the path to development and then tell them that there is nothing left for their advancement, because we have used up all the resources. We may even say, "We want to put controls on you as you move through the different industrial revolutions, to curb the pollution." We must have a revolution in accountability over resource management, not just nationally, but globally. You cannot on the one hand provide development aid while knowing that, on the other hand, down the road there won't be anything left for them. We have not had any positive outcome in this revolution yet, and certainly not during the last year or so as the world powers continue to use self-interest above humanity. World powers are guided by self-interest, they are not guided - as nations like us are - on a higher human plane.

There are nations in development that are screaming for this country to take the lead in the world in regard to conflict resolution, to logical human responses, to respect of human life; to take the lead, in fact in proclaiming that every human is human. I had a staff officer from a great nation come into my headquarters [in Kigali], about three weeks into the genocide. And he started asking questions, like "How many Rwandans were killed yesterday? How many were killed last week? How many do you expect to be killed

today? How many over the next week, the next three weeks?" And my staff officers, the few Canadians that had flown in, were so revolted by this person that they hauled him up to my office. And he told me what he was doing, and asked if I would acquiesce in it. And I said, "What is the aim?" And the aim was the following: he was sent to conduct an assessment of risk, and the risk was the following. It was believed by that nation that the nation could accept one soldier injured or killed for every 85,000 dead Rwandans. He was expressing his nation's fear of casualties, its fear of involvement, its self-interest. Rwanda is on nobody's radar screen.

In that same country of Rwanda there are 320-odd mountain gorillas in the mountain area in the northwest. They are an endangered species - you remember the film "Gorillas in the Mist", the story of Diana Fossey who was killed during her efforts there. I believe still today that, if some group decided to go and wipe out all those gorillas, there would be more of an haroosh, more of an involvement by the international community than there was when they were slaughtering tens of thousands every day in that same country.

This nation [Canada] is uncomfortable with these attitudes. We have problems in turning on the newscast and go absolutely nuts because one of our own people is being mistreated by the judicial system, and will mobilize all kinds of resources for that individual. I am proud and happy that we do that. However, in the same newscast we see [Rwandans and others] slaughtered all over the place, barely 12 hours away by aircraft. Do we have no problem with that? I think we do. I think this country has already reached a plateau of humanity, has already absorbed the essence of Kofi Annan's statement on "We, the People", a seminal document of the millennium.

### **3. The revolution in public engagement:**

We have also entered an era of revolution of public engagement, of inquiry by the people and individuals into our institutions. In 1968 everybody under 30 was trying to take these institutions apart, with the slogan: "You can't trust anybody over 30." Today, we see a more sustained questioning of our institutions and a demand for transparency. The instrument is the media, spurred by the people who don't simply accept the fact that conservative institutions are there for good and all. Imagine what we in the military went through in the 1990s for being secretive. Old notions of putting a lieutenant at the gate to say that, "there's no comment from the general", don't work any more. They demand transparency in what we are doing here inside of this nation and what we are doing outside. Some nasty people will say that this communications transparency, this desire to know everything that's going on, and the use of the media which maximizes, will culminate on the day when you will have a running commentary about a soldier in a trench getting a bullet between the eyes.

How do we balance this dimension of transparency and ensure we have more positive than negative effect? I believe it is producing a more positive effect. There is less of the flimflam; there are more pondered statements that satisfy people than simply hearing, "Trust me because I know better". Generals on [Parliament] Hill with medals, saying to politicians "Trust me", were a phenomenon of the 1950s, but the ascendancy of generals

of that time has disappeared. I don't regret it disappearing. I recall what the military did in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis when we started to mobilize before the Minister of Defence knew anything was happening, because our friends down south were quite insistent. We are not doing that this time, at all.

#### **4. A revolution of information systems:**

The transparency exercise will continue to evolve with the revolution of information. The revolution of information systems is going to be so prevalent it will be like the air, it will be like being in water. We did some futurist analysis of the use of information systems in the world, and concluded that in 2020 or thereabouts we will have systems that interface so intimately that it will put into question our classic method of making decisions and finding solutions, that is deductive reasoning. It will question whether that old method is capable of handling the whole spectrum of what we will be facing at that time. No scientist that we have approached with that thesis has fallen off his chair. But have the whole lot of us moved down that road, to take advantage of this revolution, or are we lagging behind and hoping the situation doesn't get out of hand?

#### **Where is the grand strategy?**

These four revolutions have changed so much in the 1990s, and they will become more and more focused and we will see geniuses or statesmen appear with an ability to articulate a vision and guide us in a strategy for the orientation of this and other nations.

Yet, I have spoken at a number of U.S. institutions, universities, military colleges, staff colleges and a series of think-tanks; and I ask the following question. I say, "You are now the world power. I'm not sure if you are working on a *Pax Americana* but you are the world power. What is the grand strategic aim of the United States in this era? What does it expect historians to say about this world power in this era?" There is no answer. I get polite looks and no answer. What does a global power, evolving in the globalization exercise, what does it want to be remembered for, what does it want to advance? Making more money? Technology? Is there something deeper than that? And to the question, "Is there something deeper than technology and money?", you often find no answer.

We are going to face an era where we will be taking casualties, real casualties. There will be economic casualties, as some say, and casualties in the sense of security. There will be casualties in how we perceive the world; there will be casualties caused by our involvement in areas of the world. And, I am afraid to say, there will be casualties in the hundreds of thousands of innocent people in the developing world. Pushed aside, abused and sent back into the dark ages. I believe that middle powers like this nation are capable of ensuring that we don't fall into the trap of international self-interest, egoism and a focus on ourselves in an isolationist stance.

If we see what has happened because of extremists, opponents that have moved to radicalism because of a variety of factors, then one of the main areas we should be promoting strategically at the human plane is in development, in education, in eradication

of small arms, in the destruction of those who use and abuse children in war and war-affected areas. We should be tripling, increasing tenfold our efforts in those nations that are suffering from these conflicts, to ensure that recruits amongst them do not blossom and create an insecure world for our children and our grandchildren (in this case, grandchildren! Of course I say that very politely.)

If we don't handle problems like war-affected children, child soldiers, the use of force; if we let the nearly one million children that are sitting around Afghanistan in refugee and displaced camps, see the use of force and listen to ideologies that are expressed in extremist ways; if we cannot eliminate the impunity of using children in war, then we are guaranteeing massive numbers of recruits for the next series of conflicts. And in this state of insecurity we will move over the long term into a dark era. If we pursue the present tactical exercises and forget the higher plane of moving these people out of their poverty, if we don't invest in their education, and support them in establishing judicial systems, in building the ability to grasp their own future, in protecting their moderates, then we are no different than all the other ones who cannot be wearing enough stars and stripes to make them feel American.

### ***KEYNOTE SPEECH: GLOBALIZATION NEEDS GOOD GOVERNMENT***

#### **MAUREEN O'NEIL**

This is a timely conference, and not just as a celebration for the Group of 78. It occurs at a time when Canadians have been shocked and terrified by the bombings in New York and Washington. However, even before that, there had begun a rethink of the fundamentals of Canadian foreign policy, and the changes that have overtaken us since the last White Paper in 1995.

These changes are usually described (and often lamented) under the heading of globalization. The globalization generally described is assumed to be a powerful complex of forces remote from the popular will of ordinary people, and somehow beyond regulation or management by democratic governments.

I want to contest some of these assumptions. In fact, I dispute them.

Just as the fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, most of our troubles do not, for the most part, originate in any malign destiny inherent in globalization. On the contrary, my view is that most of the evils and difficulties presented by globalization are best answered close to home - by each country in question - in the quality of domestic politics, domestic policy and domestic governance. As a general rule, good government trumps the bad in globalization - and makes the best of globalization, by exploiting the knowledge and opportunity that globalization can generate.

Screeds have been written on the subject. I will only observe the obvious: that the forces of globalization are riddled with paradoxes and contradictions. Globalization impoverishes and it enriches. It empowers and it disables. It connects people around the

world, in the TV we watch, the movies we see, the music we hear and the ideas we share. It divides people, too - generation from generation, fundamentalists from modernists, secessionists from centralizers, poor from rich. And it provides rich opportunities for both good and evil.

That is all to say that globalization is neither monolithic nor irresistible. Its features are alterable, remediable, and even in some respects reversible. The very power of globalizing action tends to inspire reaction. Certainly in the democracies, there is now a strong countervailing voice insisting - as Denis Stairs has written - that "governments have obligations that go far beyond the service of free-wheeling economic exchange," and that they have, as Stairs put it, "a responsibility to deal also with the individual and communal casualties" of global capitalism.

And here I return to my main point. Rescuing the casualties of globalization - and, I would add, benefiting from the rich opportunities - will hang principally on the quality of domestic governance, including the will and capacity to deal with non-state actors. Much has been made of the so-called democratic deficit evident in international institutions, whether in the WTO or the IMF, or the G-8 or the big transnational corporations. But for most of the world's people, the worst democratic deficit is the one that afflicts their own domestic governments.

Let me turn specifically to the four important topics highlighted in the design of your conference: peace, economy, governance, and the environment. *Peace* first:

I would put this under the heading of "How times change!". The U.S. Department of Defense is experimenting with things like stink bombs that would break up crowds without hurting anybody; sticky-foam throwers that immobilize their targets with stuff described by one officer as "like bubble-gum, sort of"; and grenade launchers, modified to fire little rubber balls or beanbags. A Marine captain quoted by *The Globe and Mail*: "The world has become a much more humanitarian place for everybody." It's truly a new world when the Pentagon applies its vast resources to the deployment of bad smells and rubber balls.

This little story demonstrates two truths, I think. The first is that huge and powerful institutions actually *do* change, no matter how reluctantly. The second is that even the Pentagon has come to perceive the new threats it faces. This is the world of Somalia and Rwanda, of Kosovo and East Timor, and of Afghanistan. It is a world where threats to the peace, more often than not, are rooted in failures of domestic governance or of effective ways to manage local issues of peace and equity and justice. The remedies to these failures, and this was even apparent in George Bush's last speech, are not "traditionally" military, even as response or retribution. Instead, they summon us to better ways of governance and to increase dramatically our serious thinking about dealing with the continued preaching of hatred. On one hand, that means new or improved international institutions - more open, more responsive, more effective. I'm thinking of the International Criminal Court, or the changing norms of impunity for the likes of Pinochet and Milosevic. But for the other, it surely means developing stronger and more legitimate

rules of international intervention and re-definitions internationally of the common prohibition in domestic law against uttering threats - saying "I want to kill you" can bring a criminal charge here. People need an effective and knowledgeable say in the institutions that govern their lives. This is a matter of fairness, and of function. Fairness, because a poor person is just as entitled to a voice in the affairs of governance as any well-connected rich person. Function, because government that is open, participatory and accountable in its deliberations and decisions simply works better.

We know all too well the outcomes of bad and undemocratic governance: economic decline, bloody conflict, environmental ruin. These are failures that cannot be corrected without a broader and better informed participation by people in their own governments. Democratic government has a special relevance to conflict prevention. I refer you to the research of Bruce Russett and others and the compelling finding that settled and stable democracies by and large don't make war on each other.

As for domestic peace, a successful democracy practically by definition is a country that has created the capacity to protect and advance human rights, foster equality, and encourage peaceful change in its political and economic life. Building that capacity constitutes an important part of development - and ought to become a larger part of Canadian foreign policy and development assistance. We have done significant experimenting now and need to understand what we have learned.

The second topic highlighted for this conference is *the economy* - embracing issues of poverty, equality and population: Here too, the impact of globalization on a particular society or community depends crucially on the quality of domestic policy. I don't exaggerate when I say that domestic policy and governance can make *all* the difference in the local effects of globalization. Empirical research confirms this. In Latin America, we and others have underwritten research exploring the effects of trade and investment liberalization on environmental quality. The polemics on this issue have been fierce. One side argues that freer trade and capital flows spawn higher industrial production, more intensive resource exploitation, and competitive incentives to relax environmental standards and enforcement. The other side contends that trade brings competition, therefore more efficiency and less waste; that it brings access to clean technologies; that it leads to higher incomes, stronger political demand for environmental standards, and greater capacity to secure those standards. Who's right? The research so far shows that these causal connections can cut either way. The difference, judging by all available evidence, lies in the quality of domestic government. Policy-making that is transparent, participatory and informed yields the best results. Another example: Originally in the Philippines and now in more than a dozen countries across Asia and West Africa, IDRC has supported a project of research, training and policy advice on the impact of trade and other macroeconomic policies on the local well-being of communities. Here we are concerned mainly with the poorest and most vulnerable. The latest findings are that trade liberalization itself has much less impact on poverty than specially targeted domestic tax policy. In other words, macro-policy can be modified to mitigate the harms of liberalization, and to distribute the gains more fairly. To repeat myself: globalization and economic liberalization are *not necessarily* impoverishing forces. These are forces that

can serve to reduce poverty, given the right kinds of governance. Putting things the other way round, poverty reduction is recognized more and more as an issue of good governance.

This brings me directly to the third topic, *governance* itself, at the UN and elsewhere:

I will tell you frankly that I find it hard to expect, as a generality, that the United Nations will consistently do the right thing (as we Canadians see it) while the Security Council is structured as it is, and while so many of the UN's member governments remain non-democratic. Prospects for Security Council reform seem to me unlikely, insofar as they require amendments to the UN Charter. At the same time, procedural reforms of transparency and agenda-setting - on which Canada has been commendably active - are all to the good, however limited they may be.

From these rudimentary facts I draw two proposals:

- Canadian energies at the UN should aim to enlist the support of the quick-witted and the vigorous among other UN delegations. I say this because most governments lack either the resources or the interest (or both) for sustained attention to UN diplomacy. This places a very high premium on the personal talents and inclinations of ambassadors on post in New York. They are not, most of them, getting useful telegrams of analysis and information from home; they're on their own. But the best of them can be signed up in willing coalitions with Canada and others, on the side of innovation and activism.
- Second, to the degree that governments improve nationally, so will the UN. For example, as more governments build civil services based on merit instead of patronage, the UN too can build a genuinely merit-based civil service. And, as the UN's own capacity thereby improves, so member governments will find reason to fund it more adequately. All of which makes an argument for persistent support of UN operational reforms - and an acknowledgement that our support will have to be patient.

The final topic you have highlighted for discussion is the *environment*:

Here we see perhaps the most dramatic demonstration that our futures will be determined by the quality of our governance. Environmental issues raise urgent questions of trans-border governance. Nowhere is this shared challenge more pressing than in the case of global warming. Indeed, the science, economics and politics of climate change illustrate our approaches to international governance at their worst - and at their most promising. The Kyoto Protocol should be taken as instructive evidence that bad process yields bad effects: governments making ill-informed and ill-prepared commitments that could not be kept. In the latest agreement on implementation, we might have barely saved ourselves from our own earlier mistakes. For a much better example of process, I would simply mention the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the IPCC, set up in 1988 by the World Meteorological Organization and UNEP, the UN Environment Programme. This is a panel of governments. But what is interesting about the IPCC is that it brings together a potent mix of government experts, academics and NGOs, in a network of information-

gathering and analysis. The role of the IPCC, in other words, is to inform policy-making with the extremely scarce resource of agreed facts and tested analyses - all bearing on human-caused climate change. I believe this sort of purpose-built network - crossing disciplines and borders to get at the facts and develop consensus - represents an important new phenomenon of governance. This is the kind of network that negotiated and now implements the Landmines Treaty. Another remarkably productive network has been developing better policies and procedures for deciding on the construction of big dams, for hydro and irrigation. Two short observations on Canadian foreign policy:

- To see the future, let's look back. Over many decades, Canada's approach to the world has been, in its basics, strikingly consistent. In our trade policies, aid programs, and in foreign and defence policies, successive governments and Parliaments have engaged the world. I don't say we have always acted or invested well or adequately in this engagement; sometimes, we have not. But over the long run we have understood that Canadian well-being is contingent on the state of the world. But there is no doubt that failures in recent years to finance Canadian foreign policy, and development aid policy, have damaged our credibility and our capacity.

- A second point. As for a new White Paper on Foreign Policy, its drafters have been plunged into the world we feared would come. Nonetheless, such a review will have to address the challenges I have mentioned - and the primacy of good domestic governance. The challenges of truly supporting human rights, of dealing with the unchecked preaching of hatred so aided by easy communication. These behind-the-border issues of democracy, economic equity, human rights and sustainable development are the issues that will ultimately decide our future as Canadians. They are the proper subjects of a Canadian foreign policy that answers to our interests, and to our values as citizens of the world.

### ***FOUNDING MEMBERS KEYNOTE PANEL: LOOKING BACK, LOOKING AHEAD***

#### **GORDON FAIRWEATHER**

The notable theologian Hans Kung once said that (he believed) "that critical loyalty is worthwhile and that resistance is meaningful and renewal possible." He was writing as a devout Catholic about his own church; yet his words have an echo in what we members of the Group are about. We can be said to have a critical loyalty to our country while resisting - ever criticizing some of its excesses and urging renewal of some of its strategies and policies by which we respond to national international affairs.

I do not claim that the phrase "critical loyalty" ever actually entered the thoughts of the Group's founders. Yet the essence of the idea was never far from our minds: an overarching loyalty to Canada while feeling it worthwhile to adopt a critical stance whenever we felt that that course was warranted.

When I was asked to join the Group I felt supportive of its broad objectives and was comfortable with the participants. I will mention a few:

· Andrew Brewin and I had marched and tented together during many a struggle in the House of Commons. We worked on reform of the antiquated divorce laws, on various human rights issues and on Canada's foreign policy. Andrew and Peggy Brewin made many personal sacrifices for our country and exemplified all that is good about Canada.

· King Gordon, indefatigable, dedicated, persistent. A wonderful person with whom to share causes.

· John Holmes, wise beyond measure and an ornament to the Department he served with such distinction and to the Canadian Institute for International Affairs.

· Beryl Plumptre, Murray Thomson, General Burns, Norma Walmsley, George Ignatieff, all contributed greatly as the Group took wing, and are, or remain in memory, unremitting advocates for peace.

It seems to me that three issues crowd the domestic scene:

· Canadians have received many wake-up calls about clean and safe drinking water, surely this is an "entrenched" right of citizenship, as is universal health care. We who live in this fragile world, our island home, are entitled to safe water and clean air within a balanced eco-system. For the life of me I cannot understand how there can be political differences about these elemental rights.

· The next issue also has both international and national implications: here in Canada the unacceptable challenges faced by the working poor which have a terrible impact upon far too many children requires urgent action. We are well aware of the fact that Statistics Canada data indicate that one in every five Canadian children still lives below the poverty line. Canada ranks a low 17th among OECD countries in terms of how we deal with poverty.

· Finally, an imperative in this short list of goals is how our institutions consider and decide issues of rights, participation, identity, and social cohesion.

The panel on Peace and Security will cover many of the challenges that affect us all. Three preoccupy me: United Nations reform, the militarization of space and the worldwide movement of peoples either as immigrants or as refugees.

1. The United Nations has undergone important changes particularly during the term of the current Secretary-General, Kofi Annan. One glaring dislocation is the imbalance of the Security Council. Fifty-five years have passed since San Francisco, and it is trite to say how the world has changed since the founding of the United Nations. The Permanent Five qualified for their positions solely because they "won" the war. The entitlement of Britain, France and Russia to such status in the 21st century is open to question, especially when countries like Brazil, India, and Japan are subject to the pressures of seeking electoral support.

2. The militarization of space threatens the peace and stability of the world. Space is a common heritage of all humankind - the peasant in Bangladesh and the logger in British Columbia share space. The question must be asked: How does the United States justify such a unilateral and provocative act? The militarization of space is an example of latter-day imperialism.

3. Fifty years ago the United Nations adopted an agreement designed to protect people fleeing persecution in their countries of origin. The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees defines what it means to be a refugee. It establishes a duty to treat migrants fairly and humanely and to develop a process to hear their claim and to offer sanctuary and protection to legitimate victims. Canada duly ratified the Convention and the Supreme Court decided in 1985 in the *Singh* decision that processing the application without the benefit of actually hearing the claimant in person did not satisfy the principles of fundamental justice as guaranteed by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Immigration and Refugee Board each year finds that between 10,000 and 15,000 of the more than 30,000 claims heard are well founded. Meanwhile, Immigration Canada identifies a further 10,000 to 12,000 people living in refugee compounds all across the world for government sponsorship. We should be proud, yet not sanguine, about these numbers which along with the regular flow of immigrants amounts to approximately 250,000 new arrivals annually. It should be noted that Canada, along with the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and Israel make up the handful of countries of the world with well-defined immigration policies.

Sadly there are many examples of cases where countries fail to live up to the protections afforded by the Refugee Convention that they ratified. Australia is the latest example of this and even the Labour Government in Britain is in danger of succumbing to xenophobia and jingoism. The courts in Australia have taken the government to task for its crude handling of the Afghan refugees. The Australian case is a chilly reminder of the *St. Louis*, a ship loaded with Jewish refugees that was turned away from Canada and the United States in 1939 and forced to return to Europe and certain death.

There are approximately 12 million refugees in the world today. Calls are out for rewriting the 1951 Refugee Convention but as Johannes van der Klaauw, senior European Affairs officer for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, says: "The Convention is not the problem. [We] have to look at why people are so desperate to come [to Europe], why there are all these movements of people. There are much wider problems here - problems of human rights violations, problems of globalization, problems of poverty. That's where the international community must put its energy."

Amen to that, say I.

### **MARION DEWAR**

I think it is really appropriate that we look at where we were, how we came about. I must say that one of the greatest influences of my adult life and public life was King Gordon.

He didn't only arrive in MPs' offices, he used to go down to City Council! Even if you didn't want to hear him, he was heard because he refused to leave.

General Dallaire's talk last night made me think about Andy and Peggy Brewin. The biggest strength I think they had - and we have today, but we have not legitimized it - is that they had a vision and they had a dream. When you talk about visions and dreams today, you are almost patted on the head and told you don't understand technology. What we have to recognize is where we have come from, and where we are going.

It is wonderful to sit in this room with a group of friends and talk about what splendid ideas we had and what dreams we had - but what use are they if we are not putting them forth and why hasn't the next generation grabbed them?

I sense that the next generation hasn't grabbed them because we haven't legitimized them to do it. When we see the young people that are on the streets, they are demonstrating that they are still being put down, they are standing there and still going through all that criticism and saying, "I am going here to stay. Just because there are a few people that are being bad and disruptive, you're not going to send me home." Part of that whole message has been to send those large numbers home that have dared to have some dreams and have no avenues of expression.

The Group of 78, in its original background was getting to groups of people and trying to get those groups to become participants - those groups of people still exist, they are still there, those organizations are still there. Some of those organizations have been certainly minimized in many ways and not paid as much attention to. As a collective group, and as a collective group of Canadian citizens, they can start to have attention paid to them. But we have got to bring people in from those groups, so that we can start to talk about how we are going to dream together.

I don't apologize for dreaming. When we were out on the streets and trying to make sure that we would put a stop to nuclear weapons, we weren't just there because we were out for a heyday; we were out there because we really did believe in a beautiful world where we accepted each other as human beings, and believed that the human family really did exist.

I don't hear an outcry from the Canadian people because we are not connecting, because the people who are dreaming haven't got the other people to connect with, to be able to help them to complete that dream. I think it so important. In the beginning of the Group of 78 we really did believe in connecting.

We have got to enfranchise those groups now; we have got to defer to them. It is not easy - it is much nicer to come and meet and talk about the terrible state of the world. I feel very strongly that the impact of September 11 hasn't even touched us. Consciously it may have done; I don't think we know what has happened to us subconsciously as individuals. My son said yesterday that he met somebody, who said 'How are you?' And he said, 'I don't know how I am.' And she stopped and said, 'What do you mean?' and he said, 'I

have no idea how I am but, when I find out how I am, I will let you know.' I said, 'I hadn't thought about that, but I think you have touched on something.'

We don't know how we are. We do know it's possible to bring people together, we do know that we still respect some of the groups that we were talking about. And some that we have lacked, to pull into our discussions and to our dreams and to be able to implement our dreams, are our authors and our poets. We brag about what we have done in Canadian literature; we have done a lot in Canadian literature but we haven't taken those messages and really analyzed them and applied them to public policy. I am not just talking about policy papers; I am talking about novels and poems - and there are some very good pieces. Those are the kinds of things we need to do as the Group of 78.

I think that, for the memory of especially King Gordon and Andy and Peggy Brewin who were really exceptional people as far as understanding where the world's humanity should be going, the Group of 78 has to take that leap and say: 'We are going to spend the next year, two years, three years, whatever; but we are going to rebuild through the framework that we started with, and (not just going out and looking for young people or looking for this group or that group) taking the legitimate organizations and giving them some power in the process of what we are doing, and bringing them together, because then they can go to their membership.'

### **MURRAY THOMSON**

The telephone rang insistently one cold morning in January 1980.

It was King Gordon, again. I don't remember his exact words, but he wanted to take action on the current crisis. The Soviets had invaded Afghanistan and NATO was installing Pershing 2 and ground-based cruise missiles in Europe. Under the heading "A Mad Rush Toward Military Confrontation," a writer in *The New York Times* said that "the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, and United States over-reaction, represent the most serious setback to international relations since the Vietnam War, and an alarming threat to peace now and for the foreseeable future. The militarists on all sides are having a heyday, at incalculable cost to the economic and physical security of us all." President Carter went farther, calling the implications of the invasion "the most serious threat to peace since the Second World War". Fear of a nuclear crisis was palpable. The Doomsday Clock of *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* was moved from 9 to 7 minutes to midnight. A year later, in 1981, from 7 up to just 4 minutes before the midnight strike of doom. So we called a meeting on 4 February 1980, and five turned up: *King, Andy Brewin, Greg Wirick, Bill Janzen* and myself. It was agreed that something must be done: another meeting, perhaps, or an advertisement, or a letter to Prime Minister Trudeau. Not until a year later, on 23 February, 1981, at a meeting at the Brewins' home, did we get around to writing a Statement and signing up endorsers. Although the process of inviting endorsers seemed haphazard, such as writing down names on the backs of envelopes, there was a method, too. We wanted people who could influence and inspire their members to support the Statement. That's why we signed up the head of the Canadian Labour Congress, *Dennis McDermott*; the heads of the Federation of Agriculture and the

National Farmers Union, *Dave Kirk* and *Alf Gleave*; the Secretary of the Co-operative Union of Canada, *Bruce Thordarson*; United Church Moderators *Lois Wilson* and *Bob McClure*; Anglican Primate *Ted Scott* and Catholic Archbishop *A.L. Penney*; *Donald MacDonald*, secretary of the Presbyterian Church; and *Heather Johnston*, President of the Canadian Council of Churches; *Lucie Pépin*, president of the Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women. Taken together, these eleven Canadians headed organizations with several million members. We also wanted outstanding academics and intellectuals and so recruited seven university presidents from across the country: *James Ham*, *Margaret Fulton*, *Gregory McKinnon*, *Michael Oliver*, *Francis Leddy*, *Roger Guindon* and *Peter Meincke*. We added outstanding faculty members like *John Polanyi*, *Northrup Frye*, *Ursula Franklin*, *John Sigler*, *Frank Scott*, *John Meisel*, *Maxwell Cohen*, *Roby Kidd* and *Elizabeth Mann Borgese*. We also wanted Canadian leaders in communications and the arts so we signed up *Margaret Laurence*, *Patrick Watson*, *Margaret Atwood*, *Pierre Berton*, *Maynard Gertler*, *Clyde Sanger* and *Anton Kuerti*. We wanted strong participants in international development and so got *Maurice Strong*, *Paul Gérin-Lajoie*, *Tim Brodhead*, *Norma Walmsley*, *Richard Harmston* and *Yvon Madore*. From the peace community we signed up *Nancy Pocock*, *Thérèse Casgrain*, *David Smith* and *Diana Wright*. We wanted Canadians with strong leadership at the UN and got *Hugh Keenleyside*, *Adelaide Sinclair*, *John Humphrey*, *Bill Epstein* and *General Tommy Burns*. We also sought Canadians with political and diplomatic and parliamentary experience and persuaded *Tommy Douglas*, *David MacDonald*, *Gordon Fairweather*, *Renaude Lapointe*, *James George*, *Escott Reid*, *Marion Dewar*, *George Ignatieff* and *Florence Bird* to agree to endorse the statement. 20 years ago our biggest fear was nuclear war; today it appears to be international terrorism and civil wars. Yet there are still 4,000 warheads with launch-on-warning status which have not been de-targeted. The total destructive power of the estimated 30,000 warheads in the world today approaches 8,000 megatons, or 8 billion tons. Our 1981 Statement went farther than calling for "the removal of the threat of nuclear war". It called on Canada to "incorporate in its foreign policy the principal objectives set forth in the Final Document of the 1978 UN Special Session on Disarmament". These included a recognition that security cannot be built on the accumulation of weapons (do you hear that, George Bush?), and a change in spending priorities so as to concentrate on helping to meet the basic needs, and promote the self-reliance of the absolute poor" (are you listening, Jean Chrétien?) As one of six NGO members on the Canadian Delegation, an initiative for which we can thank Geoffrey Pearson, I was impressed by how hard the delegations worked. There was a feeling, both of exhilaration and exhaustion when, at 2 a.m. two days and nights into overtime, the Final Document was accepted. Many consider that the document was, and is, a landmark in the ongoing struggle for disarmament, a struggle that must increase in the weeks and months ahead. Let me quote from a recent e-mail: "Every weapon-type in the US nuclear arsenal is being upgraded under the \$6 billion a year "Stockpile Stewardship" program, many with enhanced military capabilities. In addition, the nuclear weapons labs are exploring ways to use low-yield nuclear weapons to destroy underground tunnels and bunkers and chemical or biological weapons facilities. This threatens to blur the distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons, thus lowering the political barrier to their use. Bush's plans do not address the fundamental assumptions underlying U.S. nuclear weapons policy. The US may reduce the number of warheads it maintains, but it

has no plans to reduce the essential character of its nuclear arsenal. Both the United States and the Russian Federation now possess large, diversified, viable arsenals of strategic, offensive weapons consisting of various types of ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers."The writer concluded: "We in the peace movement need to recognize NMD, TMD, space-based weapons, first-strike nuclear weapons and precision, low-yield nukes as inter-connected parts of one integrated, offensive, global war-fighting system."And all this before the tragedy of September 11.At the outset, the Group of 78 did not envisage engaging in actions other than the use of the original statement to influence Canadian foreign policy. However, individual members sometimes came together for particular purposes, such as opposition to cruise missile testing. When Andy Brewin died it was decided to hold a conference in his name, at Stoney Lake, an initiative which has continued in these annual events. Lunches with speakers became regular features in Ottawa. Max Cohen, Maynard Gertler and others teamed up to put on a large international conference of lawyers and others examining the legality of nuclear weapons. It featured a confrontation between our John Polanyi and Edward Teller, the father of the hydrogen bomb.Looking back at the 20-year-old Statement it is striking to see how relevant it is today. We continue to face the priority challenges we identified then: to ban nuclear weapons, to narrow the poverty gap; to strengthen the United Nations and international institutions like the International Court of Justice, and to bring into being an International Criminal Court.In addition, we now have to confront our fear of faceless, nameless terrorist acts, together with a marked hardening of U.S. foreign policy, followed by that of Canada and many other countries. So, instead of moving towards a ban on nuclear arms we are likely to witness the proliferation of both mini-nukes and maxi-nukes. Instead of controlling arms spending and the arms trade, we are likely to see an expansion of them. For, if the US can instantly add \$40 billion to its defense budget, so can other countries in proportionate amounts.Instead of relaxing national security laws in countries as diverse as Canada and Singapore, or Britain and Indonesia, we are likely to see a tightening of them, greater surveillance, fewer opportunities for dissent, less freedom of the press, and more people in detention and jail.What, then, should we do? And what can we do? I have no magic answers, of course. We are now out in the open, exposed, strictly on our own. We are divided, too, seemingly with few resources, and without direct access to the levers of power. We know we must replace the dominant belief of "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth" with that of "doing unto others what you would have them do unto you". For we know full well that the world will not long survive on the principle of revenge. Northern Ireland has taught us that, and Rwanda and the Middle East. Can the Group of 78, despite its rather loose and casual record, and a certain hardening of the arteries, play its part in this challenge? I believe it can. We can begin by re-affirming our adherence to the documents which give direction to our mandate: the UN Charter, Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Final Document from the UN's First Special Session on Disarmament. Not just support, either; we should seek to insert them into the political debates in Parliament, using these ethical yardsticks to measure and challenge legislation and budgets on both sides of the formerly undefended border.There's an even greater need now than there was 20 years ago for Canadian organizations and individuals to speak, write and organize for achieving these goals, adding human rights and a clean environment as priorities and showing how they are inter-related.While we're at it, if we believe this Group has

something important to offer, then we might as well expand its membership, as we've tried many times before, to ensure that some of the gaps are filled: more francophones, more young people, more from the West and Atlantic provinces.

I'll give the last word to the person with whom I started this talk: King Gordon. In his introduction to the 1986 publication: *Canada and Common Security: the Assertion of Sanity*, he wrote: "If [this] book carries a message of hope in a dangerous world, it is because it bears the commitment and convictions, not merely of its authors, but of a much wider group in many countries, who see the signs of a new awareness that humankind is becoming a single community."

## ***SECOND PANEL PRESENTATION: ECONOMIC EQUITY***

### **RICHARD HARMSTON**

I would like to do a brief triangulation on the theme of economic equity, a "then" and "now" in order to examine the changes and to see how far we have come. In the Group's original statement 20 years ago, we said the challenge was about the "mobilization of world resources to achieve a more equitable international order and bring an end to the crushing poverty, which is the common lot of the Third World".

We talked about "multilateral activities" for development cooperation, and "the self-reliance of developing countries within a supportive world community". In short, we said the aim was "to establish a more just international economic order".

Remember that the lead up to this was the debate and negotiation for a New International Economic Order, played out in special sessions of the United Nations, UNCTAD, and to a lesser extent, GATT. We were trying to look beyond the issues of aid. The debates addressed the commodity production of southern countries and how it could get them a better deal in the international market place.

One idea, quite hot in the late 1970s, was to set up a Common Fund to smooth the inevitable fluctuations of commodity prices. This was, in Don Quixote fashion, actually an approach to global management of the market place. Remember, this was before Ronald Reagan. Yet Canada, like most industrialized countries, was doing little to reduce the tariffs and other trade barriers that limited access of southern goods to our markets.

It was also a time when the world community conducted the first round of topical, sectoral conferences - on environment, women and development, water, food and desertification, among others - that identified a global agenda of North-South issues and targets to be met for the improvement of development conditions in the South.

Canada's aid program was, however, not moving ahead as many, including the original members of the Group, thought it should be. It was growing slowly but was beset by various and conflicting objectives and a heavy emphasis on economic infrastructure in its bilateral programming. The non-governmental development community was advocating a

sharper poverty focus for CIDA, a balance of social sector initiatives with those of the economic sphere, attention to gender, a relationship between aid and human rights, a reduction (even elimination) of food aid in favour of greater assistance to local agricultural production. However, the country's political leadership was not taking North-South issues seriously.

We leap forward 20 years and take stock of the changes - and challenges - as seen today.

Much of the context is radically different. The Cold War has disappeared from the backdrop of development issues and the market is supreme, with its western driven emphasis on "free trade". Globalization is upon us. Governments have in many respects retreated from the idea of collective economic management, to the extent that they once flirted with it. UNCTAD is virtually unheard of, particularly as a centre of debate between north and south, and the GATT has morphed into the World Trade Organization, with its imbalance of political power.

On the aid scene, much of what was being advocated from the fringe has now been adopted. The social sector has emerged as the new centrepiece of CIDA programs. CIDA has pioneered gender equality; human rights, democracy and governance are now mainstream elements of development theory and practice; participation and capacity building are taken for granted as essential tenets of most programming.

In short, the accumulated body of experience of the non-governmental community, combined with its advocacy, plus CIDA's own learning through trial and error, have paid off in the long run. This is a point to keep in mind as we continue to press for policy change in the future.

Another factor accelerated this process of change, and not a good one - the volume of aid has shrunk to embarrassing levels. ODA was cut over 40 percent during the 90s and we now stand in the bottom ranks of the OECD line-up, instead of the relatively heady days when we hovered on the edges of the top five.

Apart from the shame of it, it has meant that Canada is not a serious player in the development cooperation arena. We don't bring the innovation for which Canada was once known and we don't have the financial clout to make much of a difference in development cooperation circles. We are, sadly, drifting and lost.

To its credit, the leadership of CIDA is trying to confront this situation. The Agency has developed a working paper for consultation with the wider community. It argues, rightly, for local ownership ("the South should lead"), for coherence of Canadian policies toward countries with poverty, for untying aid further. It does so, however, at the expense of a sharp focus on poverty eradication as the sole purpose of the program, at a genuine involvement of civil society, and with the high risk of a country-by-country monoculture approach to programming in concert with the World Bank and other donors. It actually argues against supporting a "biodiversity" of experimentation and innovation, which is where the development learning has historically come from. Look at the changes over 20

years and how that experience was gained. And it is silent on the critical issue of volume of aid.

Another absent area of importance is public engagement. In 1995 the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, André Ouellette, eliminated the program of CIDA support to NGOs and others for development education. While NGOs should pursue public awareness on their own, so much more could be done to enlighten and engage the public if it could be done in cooperation and with significant support from government.

The non-governmental development community has been advocating strongly on these points and it has been an uphill struggle. Absent from the scene again is strong political leadership, particularly at the top with the Prime Minister. Apart from a couple of unfulfilled hints of interest, he has conveyed the impression during his three terms of office that ODA is marginal or irrelevant.

Has there been progress on the broad scale, regardless of Canada's role and contribution?

The bottom line is a turnaround of this session's title: it is economics vs. equity. Wealth in the world has increased significantly. Financial flows to the South have increased, thanks to private sector investment. Growth has happened, in some cases, very impressively, notably in East Asia, pockets of South Asia, and parts of Latin America.

There has, however, been little advance on equity, rather in some regions we have seen movement backward. We have approximately 1.5 billion people still in absolute poverty.

Much of Africa has experienced tragedy and a retreat from early positions. Large parts of the former Soviet Union, previously not even on the "development map", are recipients of aid while experiencing a steep decline in their standard of living. The imbalance of wealth-poverty is seen more starkly than before, particularly in much of South Asia and Africa. This gap, while serious enough among countries, could in the long run be more serious within countries.

We have learned valuable lessons in these decades - in the importance of the participation of people in their own decision making; of attention to social factors in economic strategy; the importance of women's participation in particular; the need for human rights; the need to taking a long-term view and staying the course of our actions. But as a world community we have been weak and inconsistent in applying these lessons.

We do have a global agenda; we know what has to be done. Through the round of UN international conferences in the 90s, associated with different cities such as Beijing, Cairo, Vienna, Copenhagen, Rio, we have fixed the agenda, objectives and plans of action for a wide range of issues: women, population, human rights, social development, environment. We know the tasks, we have the targets, but as a global community we are not mobilizing to meet them.

This is the sad fact of development cooperation today. Although some features of Canada's economic and developmental relations with developing countries have improved, there is a strong case that we have fallen back from our position of 20 years ago.

In closing I suggest a few points for the Group's agenda on development to advocate:

- The aid volume issue is still important.
- Poverty eradication should be the over-riding focus and driver of our ODA, both for itself and for the purpose of addressing one of the main underlying causes of instability and insecurity, which otherwise have to be confronted at even greater cost later.
- Non-aid policies and instruments with respect to the poorest countries should be harmonized with this goal.

### **GERRY BARR**

Over almost all events in which people are involved worldwide in recent days, there is the awful shadow of the calamitous terrorist attacks in New York and Washington. There is now, as well, the growing apprehension of the prospects of military action - and the inevitable refugee consequences - in Afghanistan.

We are all still reeling. It is obscene and wrenching in every way.

I think these events identify, with a terrible suddenness, those things that we owe to each other in terms of human solidarity and underscore how fundamentally global our reality has become. Those of us in the industrialized North, whose economies have depended on world systems of production and profit, are now - certainly and graphically - *also exposed* to the world's conflicts. The Global South - of course- has had its own share of those same conflicts but, until now, very few of the benefits available in the global community.

In some measure these events do point the way, with a fresh urgency, to the need for a wide focus in international cooperation, for redoubling efforts in the area of global public goods - perhaps we should rename them global public imperatives: regional stability and peace building, the many crises experienced by the displaced and dispossessed of the world, human rights and the international rule of law - all of this and more.

But there is another and equally obvious truth. It is that no amount of international co-ordination with respect to global security measures will succeed in circumstances where the engines of conflict continue to be active, or where the cries of the displaced are unheard, or where those looking for justice and opportunity see grievances set aside.

I think that most people would agree that inequitable distribution of wealth and opportunities - within and between countries, and of course between the global north and

south - have got something to do with the broad conflicts we now face on the planet. If it doesn't cause them, it certainly sets the stage.

The truth is that the Global South has not been doing well with trade liberalization nor with the suite of multilateral trade regimes that consolidate it. For example:

- Despite rapid globalization, the least developed and poorest countries, representing 20 percent of the world's population, have seen their share of world trade *decrease* from 0.6 percent (in 1980) to 0.3 percent today.
- In Sub-Saharan Africa 28 countries became poorer between 1980 and 1996 - a period of unprecedented liberalization for the global economy.
- Meanwhile, within Latin America the gap between rich and poor widened between 1990-1997, at the same time that trade and investment increased.

There is a core public argument - one that parliamentarians are inclined to use - to defend the spread of economic globalization and free trade. It is that liberalized trading arrangements installed through these multilateral agreements:

- Generate increased trade and investment;
- And that increased trade and investment means economic growth;
- And economic growth means a raised standard of living and reduction in poverty.

So, who could be against that?

The argument fails - actually stumbles repeatedly. Danny Roderick, a Harvard economist, claims in a 1999 paper that there is no empirical basis for the argument that liberalization generates *either* increased growth *or* reduced poverty levels. (What you need for growth in the developing world, he says, is principally domestic investment to kick-start growth, and conflict resolution mechanisms. An open economy on its own won't do the job.)

Two years ago the Food and Agricultural Organization studied 14 developing countries affected by the Agreement on Agriculture. The study showed that imports rose, exports remained flat, small agricultural producers were marginalized and food security was challenged in the period following the agreement.

Already mentioned is the example of Latin America where the economy did grow, between 1990 and 1997, but *disparity* also grew at the same time. One example of this is Mexico. As Mexico prepared for the advent of NAFTA in 1994, its poverty rate increased from 50 percent to 66 percent and continued to rise through the 1990s, while at the same time, there was economic growth.

Something is clearly wrong with the picture.

So the broad conclusion drawn by many NGOs is that, where trade agreements are crafted without their social consequences in mind, people (and frequently the economies of the developing world) will be hurt by those agreements. Disparity will not be reduced but extended.

Why is it, we might all ask, that in a world which is so asymmetrical - in respect of stages of development and needs - there is such official zeal for a one-size-fits-all approach to the development of the global economy? Plainly one size does not fit all - and in a world where the majority of national economies are those of developing countries you might think multilateral agreements would take the realities of developing countries into account.

That would happen if human solidarity and development were affecting the trade agenda. But we are in a world that is more inclined to gamble with the risks of regular, extensive and long-term disparity. "Exceptionalism" - where you find it in the application of these trade arrangements - turns up in the robust economies of the North rather than in the South. For example, it exists in tariff peaks and protectionism.

UNCTAD calculates (*Trade & Development Report 1999*) that developing countries are missing out on \$700 billion in annual exports as a result of tariff barriers in the North - an amount four times as large as the whole FDI flow to the Global South, and about fourteen times the scale of all Official Development Assistance (\$56 billion).

There is a case, put by the Global South, for steps at the WTO that would take the developing world's reality into account. Developing Countries have proposed:

- changes to the Agreement on Agriculture which would allow them to *defend rural livelihoods* and promote food security (probably with tariff measures).
- relief from Trade Related Investment Measures ( TRIMS) so local firms can be promoted and business links established to the local economy ( probably with performance requirements)
- changes in TRIPS that would take social and environmental concerns into account, and guard against bio-piracy and the Northern appropriation of traditional knowledge.

If WTO discussions revisit, and fix, the many dysfunctional features of the current agreements and display an interest in taking developing country circumstances into account, it would be a big step forward. The many unaddressed agonies of the Global South do not *produce* the devastating human calamity of the World Trade Center. Nor was the calamity at New York the choice of those who are globally dispossessed.

### ***THIRD PANEL PRESENTATION: THE ENVIRONMENT***

**CHARLES CACCIA MP**

The topic "current environmental challenges in domestic and foreign policy", ranges from climate change to endangered species, to water issues, to pollution prevention, to trans-boundary relations, to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, to the issue of P.O.Ps (organic pollutants), the precautionary principle, and so on. In each case, when these issues are tackled and discussed, one comes across certain tensions. One of them is the private versus the public interest. In each case we have to deal with the short-term political agenda versus the long-term political agenda; and in almost each case Canada and other nations have to deal with the reluctance of some major nations - and sometimes we even find Canada among the reluctant and recalcitrant ones.

In the past there have been successes, or partial successes, such as the Ozone Convention, the convention on the organic pollutants, the acid rain formula. One must say that, when given notice and given a precise timetable with schedules and percentages, the industrial sector has co-operated, particularly when monitoring the process and even when they are dealing with a socialist tendency which is quite unusual for those that are capitalist-inclined. Consumer organizations and NGOs have been most of the time, if not all of the time, in the forefront of these initiatives.

As far as I know, and my experience is limited, the United Nations has played a positive role. For instance, [it has done so] in giving full exposure to the debate on the Brundtland Report, *Our Common Future*; and then however, unfortunately, relegating the implementation of "our common future" to an obscure United Nations sustainable development committee, which has not achieved very much. At the same time, one must recognize the role of the United Nations in launching the Stockholm Conference and the Rio Conference and then the Rio Plus Five and now we hope in organizing the Rio Plus Ten. One must acknowledge that one can only expect so much from such a large organization, because in the end the implementation of environmental policy rests with the individual nations and their respective governments.

Climate change is an issue that is extremely comprehensive, extremely large, and which has a tremendous amount of inertia built into it. It is almost like attempting to turn in the middle of the ocean a huge tanker that has a momentum that has accumulated over the decades, and all of a sudden the human collectivity decides that it is time to turn - and the turning of that huge shape is extremely difficult and extremely slow. Basically, it is an energy issue and part of it consists in how we are going to move from the utilization of non-renewable to renewable sources of energy. That is the essence of the issue; and the international oil companies have not given tremendous leadership in this respect, except for Shell and, to some extent, Suncor in Canada, in redesigning their way as energy-managing companies. The present pressures on governments, particularly the Canadian government have been alarmist because we are partially a developing, and also partially a developed country.

It is unfortunate that, in this debate on climate change, so little is being said publicly and otherwise on the advantages to be derived from energy efficiency, from conservation of energy, from managing better the demand rather than increasing (as we tend to) the supply, and also from making our normal reserves last longer.

As you all know, the International Energy Agency in Paris has given an indication that in the case of petroleum the reserves will last anything between 70 and 90 years. The amount of time devoted to the U.S. position is unfortunate, which was very negative in the last meeting in Bonn. I don't subscribe to the view that the rest of the world cannot go ahead without the Americans. I am convinced that, if the world community were to proceed without the Americans, eventually (because sometimes it is in the nature of their diplomacy, and in the nature of their behaviour on some environmental issues) they will come on board and then they will apply all their thrust and enthusiasm and technical knowledge that they can muster.

Why I am saying that is because it is built on the recollection of the experience with acid rain, when in the 1980s some European countries and Canada formed a club and placed a 30 percent clamp on SO<sub>2</sub> (acid rain), while the Americans remained as observers. However, six years later, they launched their own program and they have caught up very well and achieved reductions which are as good as the others. Therefore one should not become obsessed with issue of not being able to do anything about climate change because the Americans are not on board.

The climate change issue is probably the most complex and the most challenging of all the environmental issues we are facing today. The cost of inaction is very difficult to assess, whereas the cost of action is easy to assess. That of course gives certain politicians reasons for not proceeding; or for finding reasons for not reducing emissions; or for finding reasons for searching for credits that would give us, on paper at least, certain reductions in greenhouse gas emissions which do not happen in reality but can be computed through the global cabal that has been developed in the last few years around this issue.

### **DR. JOHN LAST**

I think I am probably improperly dressed. I should be wearing a shabby old cloak, sandals, a long scarf and have a beard down here somewhere and look more like an Old Testament prophet. I don't want to prophesy doom, but I do want to emphasize that we are facing a very serious set of forces, all of them possible to lump together under the heading of global change.

Climate change is the most serious and important in the short term at least, but looking back over the last 100 years - it is easy to see a number of ways in which this beautiful planet in which we live has changed. Its atmospheric halo has changed with serious depletion of some of its resources, fresh water in particular, and with extinguished species. Species extinction is going on at a scale that hasn't been seen for 65 million years. The demographics have also changed in the last 100 years. The population has quadrupled and a huge number of people - 500 million, at least - have moved from one country. This movement has been accompanied by violence on a scale that has never been seen before: 100 million deaths and 400 million people maimed in the last 100 years.

Economic conditions have changed with industrialization and globalization, and the widening of gaps between rich and poor. And political forces and factors have changed. Culture has also changed. Communications have expanded in ways that were unimaginable even 50 years ago. We have genuinely a global village. So the entire planet sees, almost literally instantaneously as it happens, all the things that go on.

I want to speak mainly, however, about just one little part of the global commons, those places that belong to everybody and to nobody. In particular, I want to speak about the atmosphere. But it is worth mentioning those other parts of the global commons - the oceans, land that can be cultivated, the fresh water that falls out of the sky as rain, the stocks of biodiversity - all those things are beginning, to a certain extent, to come under international governance in ways that again were unimaginable 50 years ago, or even 25 years ago. Perhaps this Group is one that can lend its weight in intellectual discourse to concepts of increased global governance of profoundly important, life-supporting physical and biological factors that [affect] our planet and our oceans. Unfortunately, large parts of those global commons are in the hands of transnational corporations or individual governments that don't necessarily always act responsibly.

I will just skim over the surface of a few fundamental issues. Let me summarize what came out of the Third Five-Year Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in February 2001:

Temperatures have risen during the past 40 years in the lowest eight kilometres of the atmosphere; snow cover and ice extent have decreased, and that process is accelerating. All the ice cover in Africa in the highlands of East Africa will be gone 40 years from now. That has tremendous implications for river flow. Some aspects of the climate have changed in other ways. Precipitation, cloud cover, temperature extremes and so on. There is new and stronger evidence that most of the warming observed over the past 50 years is directly attributable to human activity. (There was some debate for a while as to whether it might be due to solar flares or the position of the earth on its axis revolving in its orbit around the sun, but that doubt has now been removed and there is no longer room for doubt that global warming is real and is due primarily, if not entirely, to human activity.) And the human activities that are responsible for global warming are going to continue at least through the 21<sup>st</sup> century, if not longer.

This has several primary physical effects. For example, as fluids get warmer, they expand; and furthermore, as polar and alpine ice-caps melt, they add to the volume of liquids in the oceans, so sea-levels rise. If a large chunks were to break off the Antarctic ice-shield or the surfaces of Greenland, sea levels could rise suddenly and sharply by several metres. That's a doomsday scenario. The medium scenarios have global temperatures increasing around 3 degrees celsius by 2100. That doesn't sound much, but it is a huge increase over a shorter period than at any time in the last 140,000 years. And the global mean sea-level is predicted to rise by somewhere between 39 and 88 centimetres. That has implications. If you've got real estate in Florida, sell it now and buy some in Colorado!

Let me try to summarize briefly what this means. The estimated temperature increase will mean warmer and wetter weather. Wetter because large bodies of liquids like the oceans evaporate when they get warmer and make the atmosphere more humid and moist, so precipitation increases. This means greater extremes of heat and cold - it seems we are already getting wider swings of extremes between hotter summers and colder winters and more precipitation in winters. And, globally, there has been a sharp increase in the last 25 years of the frequency and severity of violent weather events - heat-waves, droughts, floods, hurricanes and so on.

I'd like to summarise a bit about the health implications. First and most obvious, the direct implications of a warmer climate are heat-wave deaths - and these are beginning to happen. There was a dramatic example of this in Chicago in 1995 when just under 800 people, mostly old and frail people living alone, died of heat stroke. It didn't happen in the next serious heat-wave in Chicago, in June 1999. The local health authorities were prepared for it and moved all the frail and elderly people into air-conditioned malls and shopping centres and places like that - and they had no deaths at all.

Floods. Hardly a week goes by, it seems, without something on television about some part of the world that's been afflicted by a flood. These are aggravated, of course, by deforestation which is going on at quite a prodigious rate in parts of the world that are simply not meant to have big mountain slopes cleared of all the vegetation. This happened in parts of Central America and led, when Hurricane Mitch hit that part of the world in 1998, to 14,000 people [being] drowned in mud. Whenever you get a severe and serious weather emergency like a flood or a hurricane, large numbers of people are displaced from their homes and that is, in itself, a public health emergency. Sewage systems are incapacitated; there are dead animals floating around, so you can't drink the water and sometimes the water is contaminated also by toxic chemicals that flow out of dump sites when these get flooded. Crops are disrupted; so food supplies are jeopardised and food security becomes an increasingly serious and important issue.

There are also epidemiological implications. For example, the Asian tiger mosquito was imported into the Americas in shipments of used car tires from the Philippines. In the pools of water in those tires were the larvae of this mosquito, which found itself in an ecologically very friendly element in Louisiana and Texas, and has proliferated all the way up the Eastern Seaboard. It's a nasty mosquito: it doesn't cause malaria, but it does spread several nasty virus diseases, like encephalitis and dengue fever.

Another interesting example of how things come together was an epidemic of cholera in the northern Pacific seaports of South America in the early 1990s. That came about because ships trading from the Bay of Bengal brought the cholera germ either in ballast water or bilge water at least into the sea off the south coast of Peru, Ecuador and Colombia just at the same time as an El Nino oscillation warmed up that coastal sea. This changed the balance of the micro-organisms, the basic building-blocks of the marine food-chains, in favour of those little animals, zooplankton, which happen to get on very well with the cholera organism. So as a result of that, there was a cholera epidemic of about half a million cases, and about 50,000 deaths.

For us in Canada there are a few specifics that matter more because of our peculiar geographic and climatic features. We can expect, and we did experience this summer, heat extremes in south and central Canada and this warming trend will continue. In urban areas it is associated with a phenomenon called a "heat island" effect; this heat is contained in built-up areas overnight, and in many of these, of course, it is combined with smog from the combustion of automobile fuel and the huge numbers of cars on our roads. This can be a lethal combination.

There is something else which is associated with climate change indirectly, and this is stratospheric ozone attenuation as a result of filtering up of gases into the upper layers of the atmosphere. About 12 to 22 kilometres above the earth's surface is this delicate layer of ozone which protects the earth's surface from exposure to excessive ultraviolet radiation. In very large quantities this radiation is lethal and in moderate quantities it causes all kinds of problems, particularly for small organisms like pollen grain. In big mammals it causes skin cancer. Also, if we get much more exposure, what will happen next is that this ultraviolet radiation disrupts immune mechanisms. A lot of our ability to resist disease comes from certain cells in the deeper layers of our skin that manufacture immunity. They get damaged if they get exposed to too much ultraviolet radiation.

Food security is another issue. There are so many different ways in which all these things seem to me to interlock with everything else. So what do we need to solve a public health problem? I believe we need five ingredients.

First of all, we have to recognize that the problem exists. Secondly, we have to have some understanding of what causes that problem. Thirdly, we have to have the capability to deal with that cause or those causes. Fourthly - and this is where it gets difficult - we have to have a sense of values that the problem is important enough to do something about it. And finally, most difficult of all, we have to have the political will to act. Now we have done that. We did it in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries in the sanitary revolution, controlling those appalling problems that led to the deaths of about one infant in every four or five born, and to the failure of about half of all who were born to live long enough to reproduce. We solved that problem and those five things were necessary to solve it. In another example - control of the smoking epidemic which is killing millions of people every year - the five ingredients have fallen into place, to some extent. For example, we now have in Ottawa regulations that prohibit smoking in public places. So the last of those five ingredients, the political will to act, has fallen into place.

We need to mobilize the same kind of five ingredients to deal with the health problems associated with climate change and with the other global changes that are going on. That brings me back to where I started. What kind of governance can the world generate to take care of the global commons? What can we do to prevent essential parts of the global commons from falling into private hands, to prevent obscenities like some company in Texas patenting parts of the human body or strains of rice. This is a very serious problem; it is an economic problem, a political problem, a problem for governance, and a problem for every one of us. And we must mobilize our energies and rise up in protest and deal with this problem - and deal with it fast.

## ***FOURTH PANEL PRESENTATION: GLOBAL GOVERNANCE***

### **MICHAEL OLIVER**

Global Governance is central to the search for a secure world. I want to concentrate on keeping the peace but the other facets of global governance are of vital importance for global well-being, including the reshaping of world economic institutions, the participation of civil society in the organs of world governance, the expansion of international law and the protection of individual human rights. But, particularly since the ghastly events of September 11, I want to examine here how global governance relates to human security.

Canada has never been tempted to approach security through either of the two forms of "going it alone" hegemony or neutrality. The only sensible paths led to alliances or to a global security system. The alliance path pointed to NATO and NORAD. The United Nations was the hope for a global system. The Group of 78 was more intent on global security and on making the UN the instrument for peace. As the original G78 Statement put it: "Canada should make it clear that from the beginning it regarded the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as an interim security measure until such time as a general system of collective security could be established."

Today, 20 years after G78 was founded, it is appropriate to ask how justified we were in putting our faith in the development of a global security system centred on the UN. It is a mixed story.

The impetus to make the UN a strong guarantor of international peace faded soon after 1945. The Cold War pushed the security work of the UN down to a level of third-order importance - below the unilateral decisions of the two super-powers, and also below those of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

As the story goes, the important work of the UN in global security really begins in 1956 with the invention of its peace-keeping role. We in Canada valued that role highly - Lester Pearson made it ours - but only a hardy minority of Canadians were prepared to assert that the UN was as significant to overall security or to Canadian security as NORAD or NATO.

The story of global security loses its Cold War focus in 1989 with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the days leading up to the Gulf War, except for the Congo episode in the 1960s.

These were the "glory days" of the UN, if it ever had such days. Dag Hammarskjold was the Secretary-General and that brilliant black American Ralph Bunche was his deputy. If boldness, reasonableness, imagination and dedication were enough to assure success, they were there in abundance. But of course they were not enough.

Belgium pulled out of the Congo. Chaos descended, and Belgian paratroopers flew back in to rescue nuns and multinational corporations. Patrice Lumumba, the newly-elected premier, asked President Eisenhower to help, and Ike remembered there was something called the UN and passed Lumumba on to it.

The first troops for l'ONUC (L'Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo) were all African. They, and the others who joined them, including Canada, soon had their mandate enlarged to include preventing the secession of the mineral-rich province of Katanga and assuring Congo's political independence. It soon became clear that l'ONUC had been handed a job that Dag Hammarskjold described as "giving first aid to a rattlesnake".

Lumumba was murdered, Hammarskjold died in a tragic plane crash, secession was halted, and out of the smoke came Mobutu, now a warrior in the fight for world freedom, with *carte blanche* to create a regime of plunder and oppression to rival that of his 19th century predecessor King Leopold of Belgium.

But the UN in the Congo used legitimate force to uphold a UN member government. It was an action that found the Security Council, momentarily, acting in the way the creators of the UN in 1945 expected it would.

In the years that followed the end of the Cold War, and particularly in the Boutros Boutros-Ghali era, the UN made other attempts to play more than a tertiary role in providing for global security, and we learned to talk of peace-making and peace-building as well as peace-keeping.

But both the Gulf War and its predecessor the Korean War looked far more like successful American wars. And then Somalia, go on to Rwanda, to ex-Yugoslavia (Croats versus Serbs), to Bosnia and Srebrenica, to Kosovo/Serbia, to Liberia, to Sierra Leone, and to the Congo once again, what we find is a sorry story.

I am not ignoring the enormously important work of the UN and its specialized agencies in contributing substantially to keeping the peace. In helping to prevent conflict, in monitoring cease-fires, in easing the immense difficulties of post-conflict integration of demobilized troops, restoration of infrastructure, helping rebuild civil society, monitoring elections, clearing mines. The list is long and honourable of the 85 peace-related missions going back to 1948, and most of them were substantially helpful, several of them vital.

But the last few years have seen the UN displaced and put back into its tertiary role in Bosnia, where the US orchestrated the Dayton Peace Accord, in Kosovo, then Macedonia, where NATO was the security instrument of choice.

The tone of the August 2000 Brahimi Report does little to encourage us to think of a broader UN security role in the future. The report is a valuable guide to reform in organization and practice; but between the lines one can read, "Get back to your tertiary role, UN, and make sure you play it better."

But perhaps the central instrument, to which the UN Charter assigned the responsibility for maintaining the global peace, was so badly designed that it could never fulfill its mandate. That instrument is the Security Council and its capacity for reform looks small. While the General Assembly has transformed itself steadily by the admission of new members, the Security Council's five Permanent Members are fixed by name and the total membership is limited to 15.

Some reforms have been made, including:

- The SC now meets almost daily;
- Contributors of armed forces now meet much more often with the Council;
- The SC holds open debates on topics selected by the rotating presidents of the Council;
- Since 1992, heads of government meet in "summit sessions" of the SC;
- Oral statements to the press are now standard after the closed "consultation sessions" of the SC;
- The President of the Council, who for 10 of every 15 months will be from a state that is not one of the Permanent Five, now has a much greater influence on the agenda;
- Presidents now report on their period in office and can be openly critical;
- Vetoes occur more rarely.

The Brahimi Report recognizes that reforms have been made, commends the Secretary-General for publishing highly critical analyses of the operations in Rwanda and Srebrenica, and expresses the belief that the changes it recommends can be made if "member states summon the political will to support the UN politically, financially and operationally". (p.viii)

The Security Council is also showing signs of greater effectiveness in sanctions policy. Imposing sanctions was an unusual step before the 1990s. UN sanctions were used against Rhodesia in 1966 and South Africa in 1977. Their success in the South African case - bringing an end to apartheid - was undoubtedly a factor in the sharp turn towards frequent deployment of sanctions that marked the 1990s. It began with Iraq. Just four days after it invaded Kuwait, comprehensive trade and financial sanctions were applied. More than ten years later, they remain in place. Because they have been enforced for such a long period and have caused such horrible suffering to civilians, particularly children, such sweeping sanctions are now giving way to "strategically targeted sanctions such as arms embargoes, flight bans, travel bans, and freezing of financial assets". Flexibility is seen as the key: the ability to respond to humanitarian needs and the concerns of neighbouring states and to reward partial compliance.

Let me sum up.

- In spite of Canadian governments' support for the UN, and the G78's clear preference for the UN as the manager of common, global security, today's reality is that the UN acts at a tertiary level of significance, much less important than the unilateral decisions of the United States and less significant than regional alliances like NATO.
- Despite its obvious weaknesses, the UN Security Council and the Secretariat are not fatally flawed, and are quite able to evolve to a higher level of importance for global security, approaching the Charter goal.

It is all too easy to single out the United States as today's prime saboteur of the UN. Examples include:

- With no reference to the UN, or with only the most cursory justification, it has dropped bombs or missiles over the last 20 years on Libya, Grenada, Panama, Afghanistan and the Sudan.
- It refuses to pay the huge sums it owes in past dues to the UN, forcing reductions in crucial operations.
- It uses its influence to prevent the Security Council from acting in situations where Charter obligations and looming humanitarian tragedies combine, as in Rwanda.

Further examples of Congressional and Presidential contempt for the UN are not hard to find. (This, incidentally, is not true for the American people who, in poll after poll, put a positive value on the UN.)

However, it is also clear that other leading powers are not very different. Russia is far more interested in restoring its spheres of influence than in calling on the UN for aid in conflict avoidance or settlement. China's involvement with the UN is at best perfunctory. And Britain clearly values its special relationship with the US more highly than loyalty to the United Nations.

But the key to the failure of the UN's security role to flourish lies somewhat deeper, I suspect. For, like their leaders, many people in member states have been shaped by the culture of war: they really cannot imagine a world free of "the scourge of war".

Certainly the language of war and the passions of war are strongly in the air this week. When the horror of September 11 had sunk in I wrote several comments, including:

- President Bush and Colin Powell are unwise, surely, to insist that the monstrous attacks are acts of war, to designate these attacks as the "First War of the 21st Century" and to describe its response as a "War on Terrorism."

· The loss of life in New York and Washington loses its special character if it is perceived as part of a war. These deaths then join the company of those of Hiroshima (140,000), Nagasaki (80,000) and Tokyo (100,000 in a night's fire-bombing) for which the United States was solely responsible and the estimated 590,000 civilians who were killed by Allied bombs in Europe in World War Two (for whom the US shares responsibility with Britain and Canada), including those immolated in the firestorms of Hamburg (40,000) and Dresden (30,000). Putting the September 11 attacks in the "war" category - and preparing a response that is seen as retaliation for an act of war - removes the ghastly incident from the category of "crime", where I suggest it belongs.

· A "War on Terrorism", rather than a UN-sponsored police action to bring specific individuals to justice before a body like the International Criminal Court, which the US rejects, simply invites disagreement about who is a "terrorist" and who is a "freedom fighter". Does the United States not remember that it armed and supported the Mujahedin of Afghanistan of which Osama bin Laden was so effective a member?

· The "war" categorization has already brought the whole of NATO - an exclusively Northern alliance - into conflict with a terrorist foe that is primarily located in the South. Moreover, NATO involvement pits predominantly Christian countries against countries (the "harbouring states") that are predominantly Muslim.

Since then things have evolved. President Bush still talks of war - and the US and other media echo him - but he has moved away from unilateralism and seeks to build a coalition. No mention (at that time) of the United Nations, but a brand new, broader alliance.

However, let me stress the **urgency** of the situation. If we cannot get our governments to insist ceaselessly that this is a "common security" problem, something the UN was created to cope with, US hegemony waits in the wings.

We must urge Canada to set about forming a "Coalition for Action through the UN", linking together nations from North and South to put a check on Bush's coalition for war.

I think the UN - the whole concept of peace through sane, carefully built global governance - is in *real* danger.

Now is the time to re-instate and reinforce the UN. Canada should be providing leadership.

### **CHRISTINE PARSONS**

My experience at the United Nations Conference on Racism in Durban, South Africa is linked to Marion Dewar's comments about involving younger people in the Group of 78 and in political life and about whether "hoping and dreaming" was an attitude lost to the younger generation.

That is one of the key things that I brought back from South Africa. Being on the ground there, I saw there was a lot of hope. As for dreaming, there were so many people there who were addressing the past in different ways than we normally hear, and forming coalitions and networks and supporting each other and charting a better future - anyway, they are out there and they are hoping and dreaming.

With regard to our own involvement, there were four of us who represented the United Nations Association in Canada: we were there specifically to share the model of our anti-racism educational project and exchange references, and on the individual level to learn what was going on.

We participated in three events: the 2-day Youth Summit, the 6-day NGO summit which involved many workshops, exhibition booths and negotiations about the document that was issued. Finally there was the World Conference itself which we attended as observers. The first two were, in my view, forums where people could speak about what they had experienced. Those who had a voice at the NGO forum didn't have one at the main conference.

You have probably heard some of the negative stuff about the World Conference, so I am going to use this opportunity to talk about what I thought were the positive aspects of it. We don't know exactly what language came out of the working groups on "Slavery and Reparations", but we understand that the tragic suffering and loss of life has been acknowledged (the slave trade, colonialism and genocide) and delegations professed "profound regret" but no apology. Yet the breakthrough is that slavery has been declared a crime against humanity. That was for me a positive step.

Among other positive outcomes was the shift in discourse. Governments and NGOs were talking about slavery and colonization together and linking them to North-South inequalities today and inequalities between communities in the North. The history of the past and the present situation became the normative discourse, and I hope this will remain part of government and NGO discourse from here on in.

Finally, let me throw out some questions. What does this experience say about the state of global governance? What implications does it have for global governance, and what does what happened there (or what we perceived happened there) imply for global governance?

## **5. Peace and Security**

### **GEOFFREY PEARSON**

I'm here to wind this conference up: 20 years ago the founding statement was devoted almost exclusively to the danger of nuclear weapons. I was in Moscow in 1981 [as Canadian Ambassador] and I remember very well the dangers. The Russians had invaded Afghanistan the year previously, and in 1981 there was a real threat of their invading Poland because of what was happening with the Solidarity movement there. I was

reporting that the Russians were on 'Alert' basis and that they feared that the Americans under President Reagan would pre-empt any Soviet move to invade Poland. It was very close.

What the Group of 78 had in mind at its founding was exactly that - a nuclear war. Although the Cold War scenario has now been removed the danger of nuclear war remains. There are still 30,000 weapons altogether, and we have new nuclear powers. If I was writing the manifesto again, I would not overlook this danger and we should not forget it.

The Russians have said they will negotiate about the ABM treaty on the condition that the United States agrees to negotiate the reduction of nuclear weapons to low levels. The United States has not replied to that yet. And if they do not come up with some agreement, then we're in trouble. We must never forget these strong dangers because of what happened a week ago (the terrorists' attacks on Washington and New York).

But, on the other hand, what happened a week ago was unimaginable 20 years ago, wasn't it? There were individual examples of terrorism, but not of mass terrorism. Although the world of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction existed, but we were not as much concerned about biological and chemicals weapons then as we should be now. So what happened last week has to be put in the perspective of what could or might happen, in terms of the greater danger.

When we were dealing with the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security (now defunct), I asked people to define "peace". There was no agreement.

Last year, according to Project Ploughshares, there were 40 conflicts in the world, and one-third of them were in Africa. (They measure conflicts by the number - I think it is 1,000 killed during a year.) Almost all of these conflicts were internal. Everyone understands conflict between states as war, and the UN Charter was based on that assumption. The Charter was organized by people like my father to prevent war - and they meant, by that, aggression and conflict between states. That is what they meant by "threats to the peace".

Among these internal conflicts you have secession, you have ethnic, and religious, and you have property (which someone this morning called greed) - those are the four main types. And then you have terrorism, which we have to try to define.

Technology seems to drive so much today, both for good and for ill. The missile defense system is based on the Americans' sense of what technology can do - but technology can also help us prevent things happening, give us warnings and in other ways help to bring about a more stable sense of deterrence between countries. So I don't think technology is only bad; but we don't know what's happening.

So, what do we do about controlling conflict? NATO is based on the theory of deterrence, that you stop conflict by deterring the other side.

A second way of controlling conflict is through international law and international police. We have made progress partly because of NGOs, groups like ours, the latest example being the International Criminal Court. There are less encouraging developments in the question of police.

Rather than military, I prefer to talk about police as an effort to enforce international law. This is beginning to happen, partly because of what happened last week, and police through Interpol and other means, are now organizing themselves to try and prevent this kind of criminal activity. As long as you have international law, or some form of it, who's going to police it? If you talked to your neighbours about having good laws but no police force, they would laugh you out of the house, wouldn't they? The same is true of the international scene. It's going to take a lot of time, but one of the positive results of last week is that police are now more actively involved in international co-operation and in a sense the RCMP is now one of the, if not *the*, key agency in terms of national defense. I think the government's beginning to realize that, but it needs more emphasis.

A third way of controlling is, of course, through mediation and Canada has always been pretty good at that. A colleague of mine, Geoffrey Murray, and I wrote a report on foreign policy in 1967 and we used the term "helpful fixer". Canada is ideally placed sometimes to have the confidence of both sides, or however many sides there are, because we have no enemies. Our only possible enemy sits beside us, and we don't think of the Americans as an enemy. This gives us a role in mediation and conflict resolution that is special.

According to the UN projections there will be 9 billion people here on the earth in 50 or 60 years. Two-thirds to three-quarters of those people will be very poor. India has over a billion people now, China has over a billion. Where are they going to live? According to the Human Development Report, the GDP of high-income countries is on average \$26,000 while for low-income countries it is \$2,000. That gap is increasing. This is not sustainable.

So you have population growth, and growth in inequality, growth in refugee flows and immigrant flows - and this is bound to lead to racial prejudice. I am not optimistic.

There is also the question of space: despite the treaty we already have about not using weapons in space, looks as though it is going to become an area of conflict. Another area is drugs, and a third one is survival. On some of these questions, like nuclear weapons, there is a chance that international law will be effective. Yet, enforcement is often difficult. We live in a world of sovereign states, and there is not much sign of that changing.

However, one of the optimistic signs is the way people can now communicate across boundaries and borders, that's one thing the UN encourages in their conferences. I'm sure there are a lot of women in Afghanistan who are in touch with the people they met at the World Conference on Women in Beijing.

Finally, the question of enforcement. I disagree with General Dallaire. He gives a typical military opinion, which is that the idea of a UN army is "so dumb - what could it do?" But that's the whole objective, to get away from sovereign states and sovereign armies and build up a new UN capacity to act. As early as 1950, Trygve Lie talked about "a UN guard", one that would be responsible to the Secretary-General. Sovereign states, of course, don't like that. But the objective must be that we gradually build up, over the years, the UN capacity to act, and as sovereign states remain the master of everything they won't allow the UN to act. This is Utopian - but what's wrong with that?

I hope the Group can urge the government, which doesn't know what its vital interests are, and say: "Look, you have an international mission and you always have had, and we are one of the few countries that can pursue this activity of bringing about, where we can, compromise and persuading our great neighbour to act multilaterally."

If the Americans treat us as a good neighbour, and I think they do, they will listen. My father saw President Johnson six times in 15 months, a record for Canada-U.S. meetings at that level; and there is no question that Johnson listened. While this didn't lead to an end to the Vietnam war, it began the process because he was able to speak to Johnson fairly frankly. I think it is in Chrétien's bones to take this kind of approach and this will be helpful.

## ANNEX

### **The Group of 78**

The Group of 78 is an informal association of Canadians seeking to promote global priorities for peace and disarmament, equitable and sustainable development, and a strong and revitalized United Nations system.

It began in 1980 when a small group including Andrew Brewin MP and Peggy Brewin, Murray Thomson of Project Ploughshares, Robert McClure, former Moderator of the United Church, and King Gordon, formerly of the United Nations Secretariat, drafted a statement on how best Canada could contribute to the building of a peaceful and secure world. In November 1981 that statement, Canadian Foreign Policy in the 80s, was sent to Prime Minister Trudeau. It was signed by 78 Canadians -- a group of 78.

The statement set out three inter-related objectives:

1. removal of the threat of nuclear war;
2. the mobilization of world resources to achieve a more equitable international order and bring an end to the crushing poverty which is the common lot of the majority in the Third World;

3. the strengthening and reform of the United Nations and other global institutions designed to bring about a pacific settlement of disputes, foster international cooperation, promote the growth of world law and the protection of basic human rights.

That was the beginning of a dialogue between the Group of 78 and the Canadian government. In the following years, members of the Group discussed, and made their views known, about new issues facing Canada in international relations and their implications for the central, and universal, objectives of policy already mentioned.

#### The Group of 78

- meets in conferences to consider needed changes in foreign policy, seeking consensus on recommendations to government;
- produces publications on conference findings and special issues;
- publishes *Newslink*, a newsletter for general distribution;
- organizes lunches with invited speakers.

## THE GROUP OF 78 - FOUNDING MEMBERS

Margaret Atwood	Walter Gordon*	John Meisel
Donald Bates*	Roger Guindon	Brian Meredith*
James Ham*	Pierre Berton	Joanna Miller
Florence Bird*	Richard Harmston	Michael Oliver
Elisabeth Mann Borgese	Jacques Hébert	Archbishop A. L. Penney
Andrew Brewin*	Gerhard Herzberg*	Lucie Pépin
Tim Brodhead	John Holmes*	Beryl Plumtre*
General E.L.M. Burns *	John Humphrey*	Nancy Pocock*
Rita Cadieux	George	John Polanyi

	Ignatieff*	
Thérèse Casgrain*	Heather Johnston	Escott Reid*
Maxwell Cohen*	Kalmen Kaplansky*	Clyde Sanger
Irwin Cotler	Hugh Keenleyside*	Archbishop E.W. Scott
Marion Dewar	Roby Kidd*	Frank Scott*
T.C. Douglas*	David Kirk	Marian Scott*
William Epstein*	Anton Kuerti	John Sigler
Gordon Fairweather	Renaude Lapointe	Adelaide Sinclair*
Geraldine Farmer	Margaret Laurence*	David Smith*
Eugene Forsey *	J. Francis Leddy	Maurice Strong
Ursula Franklin	Clarke MacDonald*	Murray Thomson
Northrop Frye*	David MacDonald	Bruce Thordarson
E. Margaret Fulton	Donald MacDonald	Norma E. Walmsley
Sylva Gelber	R. St. J. MacDonald	Patrick Watson
Alfred Gleave	Gregory MacKinnon	Hellie Wilson
James George	Yvon Madore	Lois Wilson
Paul Gérin- Lajoie	Robert McClure*	Gregory Wirick*
Maynard	Dennis	Diana Wright*

Gertler	McDermott
J. King Gordon*	Peter Meincke

\* deceased

## THE GROUP OF 78 - CURRENT MEMBERS

M. Azhar Ali Khan	Lawrence Cumming	Fred Harland
Warren Allmand	Leo Dare	Mardele Harland
Douglas Alton	Barbara Darling	Gretel Harmston
Janis Alton	Douglas Davies	Richard Harmston
Douglas Anglin	Sheila Davies	Jacques Hebert
Angus Archer	Clovis Demers	Mark Hecht
Neil Arya	Ann Denholm Crosby	Janet Irwin
Margaret Atwood*	Marion Dewar*	Pierre Joncas
Elisabeth Barot	Jennifer Dickson	Marie Keasey
Gerry Barr	Earlston Doe	Graham Kirby
Michael Bell	Elizabeth Doe	Anton Kuerti*
Paul Belanger	Tim Draimin	Frederic Labarre
Daniel Benedict	Nancy Drozd	Nazeer Aziz Ladhani

Stephen Benedict	Robert Edmonds	Henrietta DesForisay
Pierre Berton*	John English	Corey Levine
Barbara Birkett	Katharine English	Peyton Lyon
Richard Birkett	Gordon Fairweather*	Flora MacDonald
Newton Bowles	Shirley Farlinger	Arch MacKenzie
Ann Breau	Ardath Francis	Isobel MacKenzie
Herb Breau	Ross Francis	Archie MacKinnon
Fredelle Brief	Douglas Fraser	Margaret MacMillan
Tim Brodhead*	Barbara Fulford	James MacNeill
Joan Broughton	Dwight Fulford	Phyllis MacNeill
Geoffrey Bruce	Eleni Galanis	Peggy Mason
Ruth Bruce	L. Terrell Gardner	Roy Matthews
Boris Castel	James George	Judith Maxwell
James Christie	Ann Gertler	Elizabeth May
Andrew Clarke	Maynard Gertler*	Jack Maybee
Gisèle Coté- Harper	Nancy Gordon	Nevitt Maybee
Irwin Cotler*	John Graham	Digby McLaren

Marie- Hélène	Franklyn Griffiths	Hon. Walter McLean Courtemanche- Boyle
Tim Creery	Debbie Grisdale	Barbara McLean
Carolyn Creery	Eshete Hailu	Donald McRae
Gordon Cullingham	John Harker	Sally McRae

Peter Meincke*	Penny Sanger
John Meisel*	Joanna Santa Barbara
Arthur Menzies	Dominick Sarsfield
Joanna Miller*	Mairuth Hodge Sarsfield
Morris Miller	Nola-Kate Seymoar
Hanna Newcombe	Gerald Shannon
Sam Nutt	Hon. Mitchell Sharp
Eric Hoskins	Michael Shenstone
Maureen O'Neil	Susan Shenstone
Michael Oliver*	James Shute
Tamar Oppenheimer	John Sigler
James Orbinski	Jennifer Simons
Bernard Ostry	Alan Slavin
Sylvia Ostry	Linda Slavin
Ann Park	Tom Sloan

Derek Paul	Ross Smyth
Ann Pearson	Chris Spencer
Geoffrey Pearson	Metta Spencer
Landon Pearson	Anne Squire
Alan Phillips	Janice Stein
Joy Phillips	Rieky Stuart
John Polanyi*	Alison De Muy
David Pollock	Andrew Thompson
Georges Proulx	Shirley Thomson
Ann Qualman	Murray Thomson*
Harry Qualman	Thomas Torrance
Edward Ragan	Necla Tschirgi
Farhang Rajae	Alison Van Rooy
Anatol Rapoport	Norma E. Walmsley*
Ernie Regehr	Fergus Watt
Tim Reid	Dee Welch
John Reid	Ann Weston
Doug Roche	Ken Williamson
Roseann Runte	Lois Wilson*
William Ryan	Azaletch Worku Asfaw
Dexter Sampson	Max Yalden
Joan Sampson	Mark Vorobej
Clyde Sanger*	Ann Young
* founding member	Christopher Young